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I. INTRODUCTION
The demise of the Soviet Empire has sparked a renaissance in comparative
social science and legal scholarship. Since emerging from the Soviet shadow,
the developing nations of Central and Eastern Europe1 have increasingly
looked west for ideas and precedents in establishing the foundations of their
new societies. Western ideas regarding the structure of the economy, the
relationship between the various branches of government, and the relationship
of the state to the individual have come under scrutiny in an attempt to
transpose the experience the West has to offer onto the traditions and
institutions of the emerging nations. 2 At the same time, Western scholars have
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I The nations now arising out of the fall of the Soviet Union include others than those
in Europe. This Article, however, is limited to those nations whose traditions and futures
are more European than Asian. From a comparative perspective, the problems faced by
Asiatic nations like Kirghizstan may be substantially different than those faced by European
nations such as Ukraine. To take the most obvious example, the nations of the Central Asian
steppes are likely to be heavily influenced by Muslim legal traditions, an influence unlikely
to make itself felt in the new European nations.
2 In addition to comparative analysis of the domestic experiences of the Western
nations, the new states have also found notions of customary and multilateral international
law to be useful in structuring their post-Soviet societies. See Matthias Hartwig, The
Institut'onalizat'on of the Ride of Lmv: 7he Establishment of Constitutional Courts in the
Eastern European Counfties, 7 AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 449, 457 (1992) ("After having
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renewed their own comparative studies, both to provide assistance to the new
states and in a reflective attempt to understand the nature of the end of the Cold
War.
Comparative scholarship has a great deal to offer the new nations of
Central and Eastern Europe as they struggle to found free and stable
democracies on the rubble of the Soviet dictatorship. Of course, it would be a
sign of the most extreme hubris for those who are part of the Western tradition
to believe either that our largely idiosyncratic systems of social organization are
inherently superior to the possible alternatives, or that the valuable aspects of
our culture can be easily transferred into societies of which we have only the
dimmest understanding. For those new nations of Central and Eastern Europe
that are interested in democratic self-government, however, the experience of
the West can be a fountain of potentially useful information at both the
theoretical and practical levels. The diversity of the Western democracies offers
a broad opportunity for the new nations to benefit from the comparative
analysis of governmental institutions and practices. By examining the various
choices made by nations like Great Britain, France, Germany, and the United
States, much can be learned about the range of alternatives that exists within
the framework of democratic self-government. Furthermore, by investigating
the practical consequences of those choices, it is possible to develop some
concept of the factors that bear on the relative successes and failures of the
Western nations.
This Article represents a limited effort in this direction. Its goal is to
examine some of the comparative aspects of the institution of judicial review
and relate them to a number of the choices presently faced by the developing
nations of Central and Eastern Europe. In pursuing this objective, the Article
proceeds in three parts. Because judicial review is essentially a judicial
function, Part I sketches three of the competing legal-judicial traditions that are
likely to be relevant to the new states. It also develops insight into the ways in
which the impact of these legal-judicial traditions may manifest themselves in
terms of the attitudes and capabilities of cultures and governments with respect
to judicial review. Part II applies some of the insight gained from the
examination of the various legal-judicial traditions to several of the important
questions of practical institutional design associated with judicial review.
Finally, Part I steps back from the details of judicial review to discuss briefly
the broader question of the relationship of judicial review to democracy as it is
understood in Western thought.
lost their ideological identity, Central and Eastern European countries are attempting to find
a new ground on which they can establish their legal structure by referring to international
standards.").
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An article of this limited scope cannot attempt to provide complete answers
to the many questions that judicial review raises. At best, a comparative
analysis of judicial review can merely highlight the similarities and differences
existing in institutions among nations and possibly offer some insight into the
solutions available. The actual form that judicial review takes in any given state
will depend on a variety of local factors, none of which can be dealt with in an
article of this length. In Professor Mauro Cappelletti's words, judicial review is
dependent upon "contingent variables such as a given society's history and
traditions, the particular demands and aspirations of that society, its political
structures and processes, and the kind of judges it has produced." 3
Despite the impossibility of formulating precise answers regarding the
scope and shape of judicial review in any particular society, a comparative
analysis of judicial review does suggest one tentative conclusion with regard to
the new nations of Central and Eastern Europe. The analysis in this Article
indicates the existence of a profound tension between the desires of the new
states with respect to the protection of individual rights and the capabilities of
those nations in fulfilling these goals. In reaction to well-known deficiencies in
the performance of the prior Communist governments, particularly with respect
to individual rights, many of the new nations are eager to provide a broad array
of civil and political rights to their citizens. However, the institutional
capabilities for thejudicial protection and enforcement of those rights are often
lacking. As a result, decisions with respect to the appropriate form of judicial
review may be caught between the Scylla of overly ambitious statements of
rights and judicial impotence in protecting those rights and the Charybdis of
failing to protect certain rights at all. In order to provide protection of an
adequate menu of individual rights in the face of inadequate judicial resources,
therefore, the new states will have to find or create means beyond simple
judicial review for alternative methods of guaranteeing individual constitutional
rights.
HI. LEGAL TRADrTIONS OF JUDICIAL ACTION
In approaching comparative analysis of an institution as varied and
complex as that of judicial review, it is useful to be clear about the definition of
the institution under inspection. "Judicial review" is defined as any judicial
action that involves the review of an inferior legal norm for conformity with a
higher one, with the implicit possibility that the reviewing court may invalidate
or suspend the inferior norm if necessary or desirable. This definition of
3 Mauro Cappelletti, The "Mighty Problem" ofJudicial Review and the Contribution of
Comparative Analysis, 53 S. CAL. L. Rav. 409, 411-12 (1980).
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judicial review includes both review of legislatively enacted statutes as well as
review of administrative and executive decrees for compliance with
constitutional principles. It is also broad enough to encompass the practice of
reviewing administrative and executive actions for compatibility with
controlling statutes, though the focus of this Article is chiefly on constitutional
judicial review. While the definition we employ is quite broad, the practices
that it encompasses are sufficiently similar to be amenable to comparison in
analyzing the characteristics of different systems of judicial review.
The chief distinguishing characteristic of judicial review is that it is a
function performed only by judges and is thus a peculiarly legal institution of
government. Whether the focus of judicial review is on statutes for conformity
with constitutional principles or on administrative activity for consistency with
statutory authority, judicial review is at its core an exercise of judicial
authority. The most significant of the many variables affecting judicial review
for a given nation or culture will therefore be its broader notions about the
manner in which judges engage in decisionmaking and the relationship of those
decisions to the rest of government.
Notions about the proper role of the judiciary, even within the Western
tradition, are not uniform across nations and cultures. Different legal traditions
entertain substantially different conceptions of the judicial task, and these
divergences have important consequences in terms of the institutional structures
that are compatible with the various forms of judicial review. Differences in
legal traditions also have historical significance with respect to the resources
that may be available for the development of new forms of judicial review. A
constitutional system may be limited in its attempt to adopt a form of judicial
review that is substantially at odds with its historical underpinnings. For these
reasons, an examination of the legal-historical traditions that are relevant to the
new nations of Central and Eastern Europe is the most appropriate place to
begin a comparative analysis of judicial review.
In surveying the various traditions that may have a significant impact on
the new nations of Central and Eastern Europe, three particular strains of legal
thought and practice can be identified. The civil-law system, exemplified by
nations like Germany and France, is the predominant system on the continent
of Europe. It will necessarily influence developments in the new states. The
socialist legal tradition, while largely eliminated as an explicit source of policy,
will also be a source of influence. Not only does the socialist tradition limit the
practical ability of the new nations to institute dramatically new forms of
judicial review, but its formative effect on legal thought and theory will be felt
for quite some time. Finally, the common-law tradition will also be highly
relevant. The common law is the dominant tradition in most of the former
elements of the British Commonwealth (and therefore much of the world) and
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offers a wide variety of experiences to those interested in the institution of
judicial review. It is also the principal source of the attitudes and institutions
that produced judicial review. While it is impossible to describe both briefly
and adequately the character and nuances of these complex systems and the
variations of them existing around the world, it is possible to provide a
generalized examination of their broader features and the relationship of those
features to judicial review.
A. The Civil-Law System
The civil-law system is characteristic of the nations of the continent of
Europe, including France, Germany, Italy, and others. 4 For the purposes of
this Article, the most significant feature of civil-law jurisprudence is its
traditional emphasis upon the limitation of the judicial function to the
application of the policies enunciated by the principal lawmaking body, the
legislature. This section provides an overview of the judicial function as it has
developed in the classical civil-law tradition, investigates the historical
antecedents of the civil-law attitude toward the judiciary in one nation, France,
and sketches some of the general implications of the classical tradition for
judicial review. It also discusses the post-World War II developments that have
served to erode some of the important distinguishing features of the civil law's
view of the judicial function.
1. The Limited Function of the Ovil-Law Judge
Traditionally, the civil law has prescribed an extremely limited role for
judges in the processes of government. Philosophically, the civil law derived
this position from principles of legislative supremacy and strict legal
positivism. Instrumentally, the civil law limited the functions of the civil-law
judge through the use of comprehensive codes of legal norms and the lack of a
doctrine of precedent or stare decisis.
The foundational principle of the civil-law system has been the supremacy
and sovereignty of the legislature, which traditionally has been considered to be
the purest expression of the collective will. The peoples of the civil systems
have typically placed an almost extravagant faith in their legislative
4 The civil-law system has also been adopted in most Latin American countries, chiefly
through the influence of the colonial domination of Latin America by Continental powers.
Robert S. Barker, Constitutional Adjudication in Costa Rica: A Latin American Model, 17
U. MIAM INTER-AM. L. REV. 249, 251 (1986). For an introduction to the institution of
judicial review in Latin America, see Keith S. Rosenn, Judicial Review in Latin America,
35 Oino ST. L.J. 785 (1974).
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institutions. 5 Having passed through the fire of popular revolution against
monarchical feudalism, the civil-law states were habituated to turning to their
Bundestags and national assemblies, rather than to institutions like the
judiciary, for the protection of basic rights. The relationship of the popular
assemblies to the people was considered to be adequate protection against those
bodies becoming sources of oppression. 6
One consequence of legislative supremacy was a strict version of the
appropriate separation of powers and a constrained view of the role of the
judiciary in developing public policy. The legislature, being sovereign, enjoyed
the exclusive prerogative for the enunciation of policy. The judiciary, in
contrast, was merely an administrative tool for the application and
implementation of the legislatively determined policies in the context of
concrete cases.7 The task of a judge in this system was not to "create" law in
any sense, but rather only to determine the facts to which the laws were
applicable.
On a theoretical level, the function of the judiciary dictated by this strict
separation of powers was made possible by a widespread belief in a particularly
strong version of legal positivism, the notion that positive law as laid down by
a legislature could be neutrally applied by a judge without resort to the judge's
own value judgments. Pursuant to this belief, judges could be considered
merely legal experts rather than active participants in the process of
governmental decisionmaking. In the words of one modem scholar, the ideal
civil-law judge was a "skilled mechanic- operating a syllogism machine."8
On a practical level, the civil-law judiciary was constrained in its activity
by the use of comprehensive codes and by the absence of a system of
precedent. Because virtually the entire corpus of the civil law was contained
5 Lloyd Cutler & Herman Schwartz, Constitutional Reform in Czechoslovakia: E
Duobus Unum?, 58 U. CHi. L. REV. 511, 536 (1991) ("Mhe European parliamentary
tradition places great faith and confidence in elected representative bodies. To Europeans,
such caveats are comforting guarantees of the supremacy of parliament over the king and
the king's judges.").
6 See Jerome B. King, Constitutionalism and the Judiciary in France, 80 POL. Sci. Q.
62, 69 (1965) ("The constituents of the Revolutionary period apparently could not conceive
of a government established on republican principles becoming oppressive.").
Similar jurisprudential strains of faith in the representative quality of legislatures also
exist in common-law nations like the United States, though not to the point of actually
repudiating the basic institution of judicial review. See, e.g., ROBERT BORK, THE TEMFTNG
OF AMERICA: THE POLmCAL SEDUCTION OF THE LAW 139-86 (1990).
7 See JOHN HENRY MERRYMAN, THE CIvIL LAW TRADITION 34-38 (2d ed. 1985).
8 Burt Neuborne, Judicial Review and Separation of Powers in France and the United
States, 57 N.Y.U. L. REV. 363, 378 (1982).
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within comprehensive codes, 9 the opportunities for civil-law judges to exercise
independent law-creating authority were limited, even when such judges could
overcome the influences of legal positivist ideals. The civil-law conception of
the judge as a skilled mechanic was also furthered by the lack of precedent in
the civil-law system. In the classic civil-law tradition, judicial decisions
interpreting statutes were accorded no precedential weight in later cases
involving the same statutes. 10 Because in theory there was no way in which a
judicial interpretation could add anything to a statute, there was no need to
refer to such interpretations in the process of deciding subsequent cases. In this
way, the effect of whatever creativity a civil-law judge did exercise in applying
a given code provision was stifled.
Overall, the classical civil-law judiciary was a relatively insignificant part
of the governmental structure. Its limited role was defined by a stringent
doctrine of the separation of powers, based on legislative supremacy, and a
firm belief in the ideals of legal positivism. The existence of comprehensive
codes covering the legal field and the lack of a tradition of precedent
contributed to the narrow duties of the civil-law judge.
2. Historical Antecedents: The Case of France
It is useful in illustrating the character of the civil-law judge, and in setting
the stage for a discussion of judicial review in the civil-law system, to discuss
briefly the historical sources of the civil law's constrained view of the judicial
function. The French experience is particularly instructive in this regard, both
because the French antipathy to judicial law-making and hence to judicial
review is so well-known 1 and because of the influence the French experience
has had on other nations in the continental tradition. 12
Perhaps ironically, the French attitude toward the judiciary was formed as
a reaction to the excesses of a judiciary that vigorously exercised the power of
9 See MERRYMAN, supra note 7, at 28-33 (describing civil-law predilection for
systematic and comprehensive legislation).
10 Id. at 36; see Barker, supra note 4, at 255.
11 See, e.g., James Beardsley, Constitutiona! Review in France, 1975 Sup. CT. REv.
189, 192 ("[H]ostility to judicial review ... marked French constitutional thought for
nearly two centuries."); Rosenn, supra note 4, at 786 n.7.
12 See Cappelletti, supra note 3, at 413 (antipathy toward judicial policymaking has
been "a basic tenet of political and constitutional philosophy in France, and through French
influence, in the rest of continental Europe, well into our century"); Antonio La Pergola &
Patrick Del Duca, Community Law, International Law and the Italian Constitution, 79 AM.
I. INT'L L. 598, 617 (1985) ("The ideology of the French Revolution has led Italian legal
thought to view government by judges as anathema.").
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judicial review. During the pre-Revolutionary Ancien Rdgime, the high French
feudal courts (or Parlements) actually asserted and implemented the authority to
review legislation for conformity with what was called the "fundamental laws
of the realm." 13 This power was employed not to leaven the arbitrary
imposition of royal prerogative, but instead to impede the passage of those
moderate reforms to which the monarch and his ministers had actually
agreed. 14 Indeed, the power of the Parlements to review legislation was
"considered to be one of the most outrageously conservative features of the
country." 15
Not only did the French judiciary employ its power of judicial review to
prevent reform of the existing system, but the judiciary itself was one of the
more abusive features of the Ancien Rfgime. By the time of the Revolution,
most French judicial posts were owned by the nobility and bought and sold like
other feudal properties. 16 There were no particular requirements for judicial
office and no effective means of controlling the arbitrary exercise of judicial
authority. 17 Judicial incompetence and corruption were the norm among the
members of the Parlements; at the same time, these institutions were
employing their authority of judicial review to prevent reform of the feudal
system.
Not surprisingly, once the French revolutionaries had removed the
monarchy and installed a (semi)popular government, they had no use for
powerful and independent judges or for the institution of judicial review.18 One
of the first acts of the Revolutionary government was to abolish the
Parlements.19 In the place of the independently minded feudal judiciary, the
13 Rosenn, supra note 4, at 786 n.7; see MAURo CAPPELLETrI, JuDIcLAL REVIEW IN
THE CONTEMPORARY WORLD 34 (1971). Technically, the power of the Parlements arose
through their ability to refuse "registration" to royal legislation. If legislation was not
"registered" by the Parlements, the theory went, it was not law. JOHN P. DAWSON, THE
ORACLES OF THE LAW 364-66, 369-70 (1968).
14 See DAWSON, supra note 13, at 369 ("By 1750, the Parlernents had emerged as an
articulate and determined opposition, resisting every effort at moderate reform that
successive ministers sought to propose."); Cappelletti, supra note 3, at 412-13; see also
CAPPELLETTI, supra note 13, at 35 ("[The judges of the French Parlements]
were... among the bitterest enemies of even the slightest liberal reform. They were the
fiercest opponents of the Revolution.... ."); Rosenn, supra note 4, at 786 n.7.
15 Cappelletti, supra note 3, at 412-13.
16 DAWSON, supra note 13, at 355-56.
17 See id. at 358-59.
18 The revolutionaries also had little use for many of their former judges. Judges of the
Parlements were among the first to be sent to the guillotine. See CAPPELLETTI, supra note
13, at 35.
19 See DAWSON, supra note 13, at 370.
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Revolutionaries established a court system in which judges were explicitly
prohibited from exercising lawmaking functions or judicial review. Doubtful
cases of statutory interpretation could not be decided by judges but had to be
certified to the legislature for resolution. 20 The Revolutionaries had learned a
powerful lesson at the feet of the Parlements and were determined not to allow
a repetition of the experience.
This marked distrust of judges in France has continued almost up to the
present day. For example, France's highest appellate court, the Cour de
Cassation, was originally instituted to act as an agent of the legislature in
enforcing the strict separation-of-powers principles that emerged from the
Revolution. The court acted as an appellate court only in the limited context of
guaranteeing that judges were not subverting legislative intent through judicial
interpretation of statutes. 21 As discussed below in more detail, it has only been
since World War I that the attitudes derived from the French experience with
the Parlements, and exemplified by the Cour de Cassation, have begun to
moderate with respect to the lawmaking authority of judges and hence to
judicial review.22
3. Implications for Judicial Review
The limited civil-law conception of the judicial function, discussed above,
has at least two implications for the general institution of judicial review. 23 To
the extent that any of the new states of Central and Eastern Europe are
influenced by the civil-law tradition, these consequences will be relevant to the
development of the institution in those states. Furthermore, because many of
the operational features of socialist legal systems and the civil law are quite
similar,24 the consequences of the civil-law legal-judicial tradition are
suggestive of the effects of the socialist legal traditions.
First, legislatures and populations that are schooled in the civil-law
tradition are more likely to exhibit a general hostility to the actual exercise of
judicial review. Even if the institution of judicial review is endorsed by a civil-
law nation in theory, the initial instances of its exercise with respect to a
legislative enactment are likely to cause consternation, anger, and demands for
2 0 Neuborne, supra note 8, at 378 n.53.
21 See DAwsoN, supra note 13, at 378.
22 See infra notes 35-39 and accompanying text.
23 As discussed below, elements of the civil-law tradition have a number of firther
implications for choices regarding the particular form that judicial review is to take for a
given nation. This section discusses only those implications that have general applicability
and sets the stage for more specific inquiries later.
24 See infra notes 47-51 and accompanying text.
1993]
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
repeal, because sizable constituencies will have been in favor of any given
invalidated statute. Even in nations like the United States, with well-established
traditions of judicial review, the actual invalidation of a statute by the judiciary
in the name of the higher law of the Constitution is frequently an occasion for
much displeasure directed at the offending court.25 In nations lacking such a
tradition, this understandable reaction may be exacerbated by the persistence of
a belief that judges should not be engaged in lawmaking. Civil-law nations
experimenting with judicial review will have to resist the temptation to remove
the power of judicial review immediately once its puissance at thwarting the
will of legislative majorities is effectively demonstrated.26 One commentator
has suggested that civil-law states can avoid this problem by providing for
codification of judicial review, thereby rooting judicial review in the traditional
forms of positive civil law. 27
The recognition of the possibility of counter-reaction is perhaps one reason
that courts exercising constitutional judicial review in civil-law countries have
typically employed that authority in fairly modest terms. For example, in
marked contrast to the United States, where stringent textualism is generally
eschewed by the judiciary, the French body responsible for constitutional
25 The recent case of Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989), which invalidated a
Texas law against flag-burning, is an excellent example. See, e.g., Associated Press, Bush:
Ban Flag-Burning, High Court Decision Attacked, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, June 27,
1989, at Al; Michael Tighe, Vets, Republican Students Protest Supreme Court's Flag-
Burning Decision, Fr. LAUDERDALE SUN SENTINEL, Sept. 10, 1989, at B4.
Along similar lines, it has been reported that dissatisfaction with the Supreme Court of
Canada's abortion decisions have led to civil disobedience by the governmental institutions
affected. See E.R. Alexander, The Supreme Court of Canada and the Canadian Oarter of
Rights and Freedoms, 40 U. TORONTO L.J. 1, 37 (1990) (following the abortion decision,
"Canadians were subjected to the unedifying spectacle of provincial governments engaging
in a form of political nose-thumbing by openly defying the Supreme Court.").
26 In India, for example, the supreme court's recognition of "unamendable" or
"entrenched" property rights in the Indian Constitution precipitated a prolonged and bitter
constitutional struggle between the court and the Indian legislature. In the course of this
struggle, the legislature passed a constitutional amendment declaring that no constitutional
rights in India were beyond amendment, thereby significantly reducing the judicial review
authority of the Indian court. See INDIA CoNsT. art. 368 (1990), reprinted in INDIA, VIII
CONSTrrUTION S OF THE COUNTRmIS OF THE WORLD (Oceana) 250 (1990); see generally, S.P.
Sathe, Judcial Review in India: Limits and Policy, 35 OHIO ST. L.J. 870 (1974) (describing
the conflict in India between supreme court and parliament). The supreme court, however,
has reportedly invalidated portions of this amendment. See INDIA, supra, at 251 n.3 (citing
Minerva Hills Ltd. and Others v. Union of India and Others, 2 S.C.C. 591 (1980)).
27 See Donald P. Kommers, German Constitutionalism A Prolegomenon, 40 EMORY
L.J. 837, 840-43 (1991).
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judicial review of statutes, the Conseil constitutionnel, "has tended to rely on
textual sources of constitutional principles, demonstrating its interpretive
restraint and thus solidifying its legitimacy as an organ of control." 28 A similar
trend has been noted with respect to the German Constitutional Court.29 Given
the general distrust of judges in civil-law countries, this development is not at
all surprising. The type of vigorous judicial review exhibited in nations like the
United States is unlikely to develop quickly.
These observations apply with less force to judicial review of nonstatutory
laws or regulations. When a court is merely reviewing an administrative decree
for conformity with a statute or with a constitutional command, the affected
political interests are likely to be less powerful than in the statutory context.
Furthermore, the potential invalidation of an administrative action does not
entrench upon the tradition of legislative supremacy associated with the civil
system. Thus, it would not be surprising to see civil-law nations experimenting
with administrative judicial review prior to adopting judicial review of statutes.
The second consequence of the civil-law tradition for judicial review
involves the character of the judges themselves. Judges trained in the civil-law
tradition may be ill-suited for the mantle of extraordinary authority that is a
part of judicial review. In part because of the inevitable public displeasure, the
exercise of judicial review requires a particularly hardy and independent
judiciary.30 "Judicial policy-making exposes judges to fierce public criticism by
those who do not like the political consequences of their decisions and puts
them right in the storm-centre of great partisan controversies .... "31 The
classical civil-law judge, however, has been trained to avoid political questions
and to only "apply the law." Such instruction is poor training for the
difficulties of judicial review. Moreover, the requirements for judicial positions
in civil-law countries tend to be less demanding. Many civil-law judges are
career judges who entered the judiciary immediately following their legal
education and have not had the breadth of legal and practical experience often
expected of judges who are to make constitutional decisions.3 2 Therefore, even
28 Cynthia Vroom, Constitutional Protection of Individual Liberties in France: The
Conseil Constitutionnel Since 1971, 63 TUL. L. REV. 265, 303 (1988).
29 See Kommers, supra note 27, at 844.
30 See Keith S. Rosenn, The Protection of Judicial Independence in Latin America, 19
U. MIAMI ImTER-AM. L. REv. 1, 33 (1987) ("Judicial review presupposes a strong judiciary
with the independence, prestige, and experience to perform the delicate balancing of
individual and societal interests that goes into constitutional adjudication.").
31 Edward McWhinney, Constitutional Review in Canada and the Commonwealth
Countries, 35 OHio ST. L.J. 900, 907 (1974).
32 See Vroom, supra note 28, at 271 n.26 (quoting Mauro Cappelletti, Ncessitg et
ligitimiti de la justice constitutionnelle, in Couns CONSTrrUTIONNELLEs EUROPtENNES ET
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if a civil-law nation elects to adopt judicial review, its ability to do so may be
constrained by a lack of judges with the training, experience, and bearing to
adequately perform the task. 33
4. Recent Trends in the Civil Law
It is worth noting that the traditional civil-law conception of the judicial
function has been breaking down in Europe at least since World War II. The
two fundamental building blocks of that conception, legislative supremacy and
legal positivism, have lost their philosophical and practical appeal and,
consequently, the continental civil-law systems have been moving in the
direction of a more expansive notion of judicial competence.
The Nazi and Fascist experiences in particular dealt crushing blows to the
continental faith in the superiority of the legislature in protecting civil and
political liberties. In place of that faith came an increased interest in the
prospect of judicial protection of individual rights. Germany, for example,
established a constitutional court with judicial review powers following the war
in order to protect a number of human rights "entrenched" in the new German
Constitution.3 4 Even France, a hotbed of antipathy to judicial review,
established a constitutional body, the Conseil constitutionnel, which has played
an increasingly important role in controlling the constitutionality of legislation
with respect to individual rights, albeit through specialized forms of review
DRoIrs FONDAMENTAUX 463-64 (L. Favoreu ed. 1982)). See also MERRYMAN, supra note
7, at 35.
33 The inadequate juristic training and resources of African lawyers, for example, have
been blamed for the general failure of judicial review in many African nations following the
wave of independence in the 1960s and 1970s. See James C.N. Paul, Some Observations on
Constitutionalism, Judicial Review and Rule of Law in Afi'ca, 35 OHIo ST. L.J. 851, 861-63
(1974). Similarly, it has been reported that early attempts to introduce judicial review in
Germany in the 19th century were rejected by judges trained in the civil-law tradition. See
Kommers, supra note 27, at 840 n.8.
34 See Kommers, supra note 27, at 837-47, 852 (describing background of
constitutionalism in Germany and the effect of Article 79 of the German Constitution, the
so-called "eternity clause."). For an overview of the history and present practices of the
German Constitutional Court, see Wolfgang Zeidler, The Federal Constitutional Court of
the Federal Republic of Germany: Decisions on thw Constitutionality of Legal Nonns, 62
NOME DAM L. REv. 504 (1987).
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rather than ordinary litigation. 35 Indeed, "the development of constitutional
justice has become a hallmark of postwar European legal theory." 36
The development of judicial review in the civil-law systems has been
further assisted by the general demise of legal positivism. While legal
positivistic ideals continue to exercise great pull at many levels, positivist
theory has generally been discarded as a functional understanding of judging.
As a matter of theory, the extraordinarily limited ideal of the "skilled
mechanic" judge has thus been difficult to maintain with a corresponding
increase in the possibility of judicial review.
As a practical matter, the adoption of judicial review by civil-law systems
has been further facilitated by graduated introduction of the institution,
typically through the "back door" of federalism and separation-of-powers
review. Frequently, judicial review is instituted principally for the purpose of
policing the separation of powers between the legislature and the executive, or
the allocation of competencies between national and local authorities in a
federal state. The Conseil constitutionnel, for example, was originally instituted
primarily for these purposes. 37 Enforcement of federalism and separation-of-
powers principles, however, accustoms responsible courts to the processes of
judicial review. This familiarity then provides fertile soil for the development
of other types of constitutional adjudication. It is often only a very small step
between structural judicial review, like federalism, and the enforcement of
constitutional individual rights. The Conseil constitutionnel took that step in
1971, announcing that henceforth the individual rights contained within the
Declaration of the Rights of Man of 1789 would be protected and enforced. 38
The continental experience of recent years thus suggests that the civil-law
tradition is not completely at odds with judicial review. Despite legal-historical
traditions that are hostile to its exercise, it appears that the civil-law system is
itself not incompatible with judicial review. Instead, the question of whether a
35 See Vroom, supra note 28, at 266-67. Vroom's work provides a comprehensive
overview of the performance and changing role of the Conseil constilutionnel in French
law.
36 1d. at 268.
3 7 See id. at 273 ("Protection of individual rights was not within the original concept of
constitutional control as instituted in 1958."); Neuborne, supra note 8, at 388 (Gaullists
created the Conseil constitutionnel to "police the boundary between legislative and executive
competence.").
38 See Vroom, supra note 28, at 274-75. For a comparison of the U.S. Supreme
Court's decision in Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803), with the assertion
of constitutional review by the Conseil constitutionnel in 1971, see George D. Haimbaugh,
Was It France's Marbury v. Madison?, 35 OHIo ST. L.J. 910 (1974). Haimbaugh's answer
to his titular query is a qualified yes. Id. at 926.
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particular civil system may permit the introduction of judicial review may
depend on the extent to which the historical conception of the limited judiciary
still flourishes in that particular nation.39
B. Socialist Legal Systems and Theory
Socialist (or communist) legal traditions, both in practice and in theory, are
relevant to the new nations of Central and Eastern Europe in two ways. First,
many of the jurists who will form the backbone of the new judiciary in these
nations will have been trained under the old socialist systems.4° These jurists
will necessarily exhibit certain strengths and weaknesses associated with this
training that must be considered when the tasks of the new judiciaries are
determined. If the legal system is asked to perform tasks of which it is not
capable, the project of democratic government itself will be set back. Second,
despite the discontinuity perceived in the West between the old Communist
order and the new "democratic" character of the emerging nations, the socialist
legal order is still the background, the milieu, in which the new systems will be
created.41 The activities of the new Constitutional Court of Russia, for
39 The trend of movement in the civil law toward an increased role for the judiciary in
the enforcement of constitutional norms has also been apparent in the Latin American
countries. There, the combined influence of the civil-law traditions of the dominant colonial
powers and the common-law traditions of the nearby United States created fertile ground for
a mixed system of judicial action, "reflecting the persistence of the United States model, the
difficulties of implementing such a model in civil-law countries, and the special difficulties
of launching constitutionalism in the Latin American ambiente." Rosenn, supra note 4, at
788.
40 The necessity of retaining the "experienced staff" of the Soviet judiciary was
recognized in a Working Paper that was presented to the Russian Parliament in October
1991. Boris Zolotukhin, Working Paper on Legal Reform in the Russian Federation, NEW
OUTLOOK, Winter/Spring 1992, at 75, 83 (English summary by Janine Ludlam).
41 The residual force of the old Communist order can be seen in President Boris
Yeltsin's recent difficulties with the Russian Congress of People's Deputies in maintaining
the pace of his economic reforms. See, e.g., Serge Schmemann, Russian Legislators Reject
Yeltsin's Choice for Premier, N.Y. TmiEs, Dec. 10, 1992, at A19; Serge Schmemann,
Yeltsin Abandons His Principal Aide to Placate Rivals, N.Y. TIMEs, Dec. 15, 1992, at Al.
The deputies of this Russian Congress were elected prior to the demise of the Soviet Union.
See Celestine Bohlen, Yeltsin is Back in Russia to Join in a New Battle, N.Y. TIMEs, Dec.
20, 1992, at A12; Steven Erlanger, Yeltsin Expects Cabinet to Keep Reformist Aides, N.Y.
TIMEs, Dec. 21, 1992, at A4 (West Coast ed.). These difficulties culminated in a bloody
showdown after President Yeltsin dissolved the Russian parliament and his opposition
barricaded themselves in the parliament building, known as the White House. After a 13-
day standoff, troops loyal to president Yeltsin ousted the opposition legislators and their
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example, are still based on a constitution that, although amended numerous
times in the past two years, was originally adopted in 1978.42
In terms of its conception of the judiciary, the socialist legal tradition
arrived at a conclusion very similar to that exhibited by the continental civil-
law systems, but through entirely different reasoning. Like the Continental
civil-law tradition, socialist legal theory adhered to notions of legislative
supremacy that afforded no space for judicial review. Unlike the Continental
systems, whose tenets of legislative supremacy were by and large historically
determined, the socialist legal system derived its conclusions from the
theoretical underpinnings of socialism. According to traditional socialist theory,
the state was the expression of the dictatorship of the proletariat. 43 Because the
proletariat could hardly act contrary to its own interests, there was no need for
any division of powers,44 nor for judicial review of any sort.
It is interesting to note that apparent concern with the potentially
reactionary character of the judiciary played some role in justifying the wisdom
of the rule dictated by theory. Many socialist legal thinkers labeled judicial
review a "reactionary bourgeois institution" whose purpose was to maintain the
supporters from the building. See, e.g., Serge Schmemann, Showdown in Moscow; Yeltsin
and Legislature Act to Oust Each Other; Clinton Backs President, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 22,
1993, at Al; Celestine Bohlen, Showdown in Moscow: At the Russian Parliament, Waiting
and Confusion, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 23, 1993, at A12; Serge Schmemann, Yeltsin Tightening
Cordon of Troops At the Parliament, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 29, 1993, at Al; Serge Shmemann,
Official Warning by Yeltsin Fails to Dislodge Legislators, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 30, 1993, at
A14; Serge Schmemann, Showdown In Moscow: Yeltsin Sends Troops to Oust Armed Foes
From Parliament; Fierce Battle Rages in Capital, N.Y. TIMEs, Oct. 4, 1993, at Al; Serge
Schmemann, Showdown in Moscow: Russian Arny Routs Rebels At Parliament As Yeltsin
Takes Steps to Tighten Control, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 5, 1993, at Al.
42 See, e.g., LAw OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION ON CHANGES AND ADDITIONS TO THE
CONSTITUTION (BAsIc LAW) OF THE FEDERATION (1992), reprinted in THE RUSSIAN
FEDERATION, XV CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD (Oceana) 85 (1993).
43 Vladimir Gsovski, The Soviet Union, in GOvERNMENT, LAW AND COURTS IN THE
SovIET UNION AND EASTERN EUROPE 33 (Vladimir Gsovski ed. 1959). See Rhett
Ludwikowski, Judicial Review in the Socialist Legal Systen" Current Developments, 37
INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 89, 89 (1988) ("Socialist law theorists traditionally argued that 'the
legislature is conceived to be the supreme expression of the will of the people and beyond
the reach of judicial restraint.'") (quoting J.N. HAZARD ET AL., THE SOVIET LEGAL SYSTEM:
THE LAW IN TH 1980s 320 (1984)).
44 See RUDOLF SCHLESINGER, SOVIET LEGAL THEORY 119 (1945) (division of powers
generally rejected in Soviet ideology); Hartwig, supra note 2, at 450 ("[T]he result of the
socialist theory [is] that all power is concentrated in the soviets, the councils, or
parliamentary organs. The idea of checks and balances between and among the organs does
not fit within that theory.").
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economic exploitation of the working classes. As Andrei Vyshinsky wrote
early in the development of socialist legal theory:
Every sort of statute (in bourgeois countries) is considered as having force until
it occurs to some private person or capitalist enterprise to file a petition to have
it, or a separate paragraph of it, declared unconstitutional. Naturally this right
is broadly used by monopolist cliques of exploiters to obtain a declaration of
"unconstitutionality" as to laws running counter to their interests. 45
Of course, the conclusions of socialist legal theory in this regard dovetailed
nicely with the pretension of the Communist Party to absolute dominion in each
of the Central and Eastern European socialist states. It is at least questionable
as to whether the Party in those states would have permitted any sort of judicial
review even if socialist legal theory could have accommodated such a thing.
Although certain Communist states did experiment with limited forms of
judicial review, 46 it seems highly unlikely that any serious review could have
flourished under Communist rule. From this perspective, the details of socialist
legal theory may be less important to the development of judicial review in
former Communist nations than the simple observation that such review did not
exist and would have been rejected if proposed.
Because the effective implementation of socialist legal theories was
essentially identical to those of the continental civil-law systems, the
implications for judicial review are roughly the same. The people and
legislatures of the new nations may be poorly prepared for the experience of
judicial invalidation of otherwise legitimate legislative or executive enactments.
This lack of preparation has already been demonstrated. For example, the
Chairman of the Russian Constitutional Court, Valery Zorkin, was early on
forced to explain to President Boris Yeltsin, at some length, that the Court's
invalidation of an executive decree was actually binding upon Yeltsin's
government. 47
Similarly, the judges and lawyers of these nations are typically not well-
trained or well-prepared for the independence required for the exercise of
judicial review. 48 The socialist legal system rarely rewarded jurists for
45 Ludwikowski, supra note 43, at 91 (quoting ANDREI VYsHINsKY, THE LAiV OF THE
SOVIET STATE 339-40 (1948)).
46 See infra notes 52-56 and accompanying text.
47 Dmitri Kazutin, What I Have Read, Heard or Seen, Moscow NEws WEEKLY, no. 4,
1992, at 3. According to the report, Yeltsin was "sincerely puzzled" by the notion that there
was an authority which could be higher than his own. Id.
48 As one Izvestia columnist is reported to have said, "the Soviet Union does not have
a judicial branch. Our courts are afraid to use their power because they are too accustomed
to being a repressive agent of the command-administrative apparatus." See Alexander
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independent thought and ability, and jurists trained in that system should not be
expected to develop such skills overnight.49 Furthermore, the lack of a legal
and political culture in which judicial independence is prized is still evident.
Recently, for example, Chairman Zorkin has attempted to act as a political
mediator between Yeltsin and the Russian Congress of People's Deputies. 50 In
the eyes of some critics, Zorkin's actions have undermined the legitimacy of
the Court,51 even though the political instability in Russia may have left the
Chairman with little choice. Thus, even when former socialist nations may be
able to find qualified independent jurists, the legal and political culture of those
nations may not contribute to the development of judicial institutions capable of
exercising judicial review in the traditional sense.
These observations should be moderated somewhat by the knowledge that
the stringency of socialist thought regarding judicial review began to erode at
some time prior to the actual demise of the Soviet Union. Yugoslavia, for
Mishkin, The Russian Legal System as of August 1991: End of the Soviet System and
Beginning of a Russian Democratic System (1991) (excerpt on file with the Ohio State Law
Journal).
49 Current efforts are being made to overcome this lack of training and experience
through judicial training academies exposing judges to Western judicial thought and
techniques.
50 In December 1992, Zorkin brokered a truce between Yeltsin and Ruslan
Khasbulatov, the Speaker of the Russian Congress, which involved a national referendum to
be held on April 11. See Serge Schmemann, The Fight to Lead Russia, N.Y. TmES, Mar.
13, 1993, at Al; Celestine Bohlen, Yeltsin, Def6ing Congress, Says the Referendum is On,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 13, 1993, at Al (West Coast ed.). Since then, Zorkin has become one of
the key players in the ongoing political disputes between Yeltsin and the Congress. See,
e.g., Serge Schmemann, Yeltsin and Rivals Are in a Standoff in Power Struggle, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 24, 1993, at Al (reporting alliance of Zorkin with Khasbulatov to head off
Yeltsin's attempts to impose "special rule").
Zorkin and the Russian Constitutional Court have also been casualties of Russia's
recent upheavals. Following Yeltsin's successful siege of the Russian parliament building,
the court was dissolved by presidential decree pending adoption of a new constitution. See
Celestine Bohlen, Russia In Mourning For Moscow Dead, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 8, 1993, at
All.
51 Zorkin's habit of announcing Constitutional Court decisions prior to the Court's
hearings has engendered particular criticism and has been blamed for contributing to the
political crisis. According to Constitutional Court Justice Ernst Ametistov, "[o]ur court
played a fateful role in the nightmare now shaping.. . . The more I look at it, the more
violations I find. That he [Zorkin] sat in judgment after he already declared his point of
view, in the parliament and on television, is absolutely forbidden." Serge Schmemann,
Compromise or No, Rivals of Yeltain Still Seek Ouster, N.Y. TIMEs, Mar. 25, 1993, at Al,
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example, established a federal constitutional court as early as 1963,52 although
this institution unfortunately had lost a substantial amount of its authority to
review laws for constitutionality by the mid-1980s. 53 In the 1960s, some Polish
legal thinkers began to investigate tentatively the idea that judicial control of
constitutionality might be appropriate. 54 In 1986, this investigation bore fruit,
and the Poles established a constitutional tribunal with authority to review a
number of legal acts for conformity with the constitution.55 As with the civil-
law tradition, therefore, the socialist legal tradition does not itself appear to be
entirely preclusive of judicial review.56
C. The Common-Law Tradition
The influence of the common-law tradition upon the new nations of Central
and Eastern Europe will be less direct than that of the civil-law and socialist
legal-judicial traditions. Still, the prevalence of the common-law system and its
close relationship to judicial review indicates its potential relevance to the new
states of Central and Eastern Europe. While the debate has raged as to whether
judicial review is a uniquely "American" invention, there is no doubt that the
common-law experience has provided a model for many of the examples of
judicial review we see around the world today. The common law certainly
provides one strand of legal thought that is likely to have an important
influence upon the choices facing the new nations of Central and Eastern
Europe as they develop their judicial systems.
The common-law view of the judicial function is substantially at variance
with that of the civil-law and socialist legal systems. Traditionally, the common
law has placed much more faith in judges and hence has been more receptive to
the participation of judges in the policymaking process of governing. This
greater degree of faith can be traced to two interrelated phenomena of the
common-law system. First, in administering the common law, judges are
52 See Ludwikowski, supra note 43, at 94.
53 See Hartwig, supra note 2, at 451-52.
5 4 Ludwikowski, supra note 43, at 99.
55 Id. at 100-01.
56 The Soviet Union even experimented briefly with a form of constitutional control
just prior to its disintegration. In 1989, the Congress of People's Deputies established a
legislative body known as the Constitutional Oversight Committee, which actually
invalidated a number of laws and decrees as unconstitutional in its brief period of existence.
For an overview of the activities of the Constitutional Oversight Committee, see Alexander
Mishkin, The Emergence of Constitutional Law in the Soviet Union, NEW OUTLooK, Spring
1991, at 7; Peter B. Maggs, Enforcing the Bill of Rights in the Twilight of the Soviet Union,
1991 U. ILL. L. REv. 1049.
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specifically empowered to make law in those instances in which a statute or
constitutional directive does not control. Thus, the judges of common-law
countries are more accustomed to the task of judicial policymaking, and the
peoples and legislatures of those countries are similarly accustomed to
accepting such policymaking as legitimate. Second, chiefly through their
experience with the Privy Council of the old British Empire, most of the
common-law countries are more deeply steeped in a legal culture that
recognizes the principle of legal hierarchy, a principle at the heart of the
institution of judicial review.
1. The Anomaly of Great Britain
In discussing judicial review in common-law countries, however, one
notices immediately the anomaly that the mother country of the common law,
Great Britain, does not now and never has had any form of judicial review.57
In fact, the British have maintained a system of exclusive parliamentary
supremacy that has outlasted even the hardiest of the civil-law systems on the
continent. While the British experience in this respect is important, it is of
limited significance.
One reason for the absence of constitutional judicial review in British law
has been the lack of any viable source of identifiable constitutional commands
that could be enforced through judicial review. The British have maintained a
constitution that is the accumulation of existing political practices, including
ordinary statutes, rather than a set of unalterable legal imperatives. According
to A.V. Dicey, the pre-eminent 19th century scholar of British constitutional
law: "There is under the English constitution no marked or clear distinction
between laws which are not fundamental or constitutional and laws which are
fundamental or constitutional." 58 Because there was no constitutional "higher
law" in Great Britain, there was nothing upon which to base judicial review.59
57 See S.H. BAILEY & M.J. GuNN, SMITH AND BAILEY ON THE MODERN ENGLISH
LEGAL SYSTEM 242 (2d ed. 1991). In Great Britain, the very term "judicial review" means
simply appellate review of the decisions of lower courts.58 A.V. DicEY, LAwOFTHE CoNSTrrUrTION 89 (9th ed. 1948).
59 Natural law, the most appealing alternative to positive constitutional law, enjoyed a
brief popularity in medieval legal theories and could have been employed by English judges
to strike down statutes, but it was eschewed early on in the common-law tradition. See
HART & SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION
OF LAW 1265 (1953) ("Abandoning the medieval idea that there was a fundamental and
immutable natural law, the common law recognized the legislative supremacy of
Parliament.").
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The origins of parliamentary supremacy in Great Britain can be located, as
can the same theories in France, in the struggles of the populace against the
monarchy. The parliamentary successes of the Glorious Revolution of 1688
instilled in the British legal and political mind the absolute supremacy of
Parliament.60 Centuries later, parliamentary sovereignty is still a canonical
belief in the British legal system. 61 There are periodically attempts to institute
some form of constitutional judicial review in Great Britain, 62 but as of yet
these attempts have come to nothing.
The British experience is interesting but should not be overemphasized. In
the United States, we are often quick to assume that the adequate protection of
civil and political rights necessarily involves the enforcement of constitutional
guarantees by courts. The relative success of the British system, at least in
Britain itself, illustrates that nations without judicial review can enjoy
significant individual freedoms and rights. We should not make the converse
error, however, and conclude that the British success can be easily replicated
elsewhere. Great Britain seems to have succeeded in protecting civil and
political rights in a legislatively dominated system only by coupling
parliamentary supremacy with a strong "rule of law" tradition. Shorn of such a
tradition, legislative supremacy can be an extremely dangerous doctrine. The
recent situation in South Africa, one of the few Commonwealth nations without
judicial review, for example, has been explained as a consequence of the
British tradition of parliamentary supremacy without a concomitant tradition of
solicitude for individual political and civil rights. 63
60 See EDWARD McWHNNEY, JUDICIAL REvIEW 32 (2d ed. 1969) ("ITihe sovereignty
of Parliament [was] ... a product of the successful assertion of the political supremacy of
the legislative arm of English government in the great constitutional struggles of the
seventeenth century."); F.W. MAITLAND, THE CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF ENGLAND 284-
85 (lst ed. 1908) (discussing how Glorious Revolution settled contest between king and
Parliament for sovereignty).
61 Descriptions of this sovereignty ascribe to it a power second only to that of the
deity. In Blackstone's words, "[Parliament] can, in short, do everything that is not naturally
impossible; and therefore some have not scrupled to call its power, the omnipotence of
parliament. True it is, that what the parliament doth, no authority upon earth can undo."
See J.W. E-RLiCH, EHRLicH's BLACKSTONE 55 (1959).
62 These proposals have been made seriously by significant British legal figures. Lord
Leslie Scarman, a Judge of the British High Court of Justice, proposed a Supreme Court of
the United Kingdom with the "power to declare invalid and to quash legislation as
unconstitutional." LoRD LESLIE SCARMAN, ENGLISH LAw-THE NEW DIMENSION 81-83
(1974).
63 See, e.g., Charles Villa-Vicencio, Essay, Whither South Afica?: Constitutionalism
and Law-Making, 40 EMORY L.J. 141, 145-48 (1991); J.D. van der Vyver, Depriving
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2. Judicial Review Elsewhere in the Common-Law World. The Theory of
the Hierarchy of Laws
As suggested above, the British rejection of judicial review is not reflective
of the general pattern in the rest of the common-law world. Most of the
common-law nations, such as the United States, Canada, 64 India,65 and
Australia, 66 have some form of judicial review. In large part, the common-law
acceptance of judicial review is closely associated with its general familiarity
with the policymaking authority of judges through the ordinary processes of the
common law.
However, another portion of this acceptance derives from prevalence of
"higher law" theories in the common-law world. The impact of these higher
law theories can particularly be seen in the United States, where the institution
of judicial review was explicitly based upon theories regarding the hierarchy of
various sorts of laws. In Marbury v. Madison,67 Chief Justice John Marshall
argued that judicial review of statutes for conformity with the Constitution was
required because the Constitution is a higher form of law. Because the courts
must decide cases in accordance with the law, courts are obligated to determine
whether a given legislative enactment conflicts with the constitutional
directive.68 When the statute (the lower form of law) conflicts with the
Constitution (the higher form of law), the latter is given controlling effect by
the courts. 69
Hierarchical legal theories were fostered in the other common-law nations
of the former British Empire by the very structure of colonial government.
While the constituent parts of the Commonwealth were permitted to govern
Westminster of Its Moral Constraints: A Survey of Constitutional Development in South
Africa, 20 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 291, 306-07 (1985).64 See Reference re Section 94(2) of the Motor Velcle Act, 24 D.L.R.4th 536, 544-47
(1986) (discussing traditional federalism judicial review in Canada as well as relatively
novel human rights judicial review under the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms).
65 See INDlA CONST. art. 132 (1990), reprinted in INDIA, supra note 26, at 105
(establishing appellate jurisdiction of Supreme Court in cases involving constitutional
questions); see also Sathe, supra note 26, at 870-71.
66 The Australian Constitution has no explicit provision for the judicial review of
statutes, yet that authority is exercised by Australian courts. See, e.g., Australian
Communist Party v. Commonwealth, 83 C.L.R. 2 (Austl. 1950) (invalidating portions of
legislation directed at making the Communist Party illegal as beyond the Australian
legislature's constitutional authority).
67 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
68 Id. at 177-78.
69 Id. at 180.
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themselves for the most part, their domestic legislation was reviewable by the
Judicial Committee of the Privy Council for conformity with the laws of Great
Britain, particularly those pertaining to colonial government. 70 Through this
process, the elements of the British colonial empire became accustomed to the
notion that ev'en valid legislation could be invalidated for conflict with higher
legal norms.71 Constitutional judicial review differed from Privy Council
review only in that the source of the former was local positive law rather than
externally imposed law.
One of the most interesting features of Privy Council review was its
demand that the legislation of the colonies not be "repugnant" to the British set
of constitutional statutes.72 This term, "repugnant," was the same term
employed by Marshall in Marbury to describe the relationship of
unconstitutional legislation to the U.S. Constitution.73 It was also the same
term used by Coke in his famous dictum in Dr. Bonhan's Case in suggesting
that British legislation could be invalidated for conflict with the common law. 74
Thus, while the specific source of the application of higher law theories in
the common-law tradition has ranged from the logical syllogisms of Marbury to
the historical practices of the Privy Council, 75 there appears to be an essential
70 See McW mNNEY, supra note 60, at 56-60. Some 25 Commonwealth nations still
retain appellate review by the Privy Council. BAILEY & GUNN, supra note 57, at 95. See
also J.W. Harris, The Pfivy Council and the Common Law, 106 LAW. Q. REv. 574 (1990)
(discussing common-law consequences of appellate review by Privy Council of different
jurisdictions within the Commonwealth).
71 McWHINNEY, supra note 60, at 13 ("The historical origins of direct judicial review
in the Commonwealth countries seem to reduce to the fact that the Privy council originally
exercised that power in relation to the overseas Empire."); Alexander, supra note 25, at 2
(noting effect of Privy Council review on acceptability ofjudicial review in Canada).
72 See MCWHRENEY, supra note 60, at 58 ("'It is the general condition of all legislation
by subordinate and provincial assemblies, throughout the British Empire, that the same
"shall not be repugnant to the law of England".'") (quoting ALPHEUS TODD,
PARLIAMENTARY GOVERNMENT IN THE BRITISH COLONIES (1880)).
73 See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 176, 177, 180 (1803). The
terminology was also adopted in The Federalist Papers to describe the inconsistency of
statutes with the U.S. Constitution. THE FEDERALIST PAPERS No. 78, at 230 (Alexander
Hamilton) (Fairfield 2d ed. 1966).
74 8 Co. 118a (Eng. 1610) (quoted in Edwin Corwin, The "Highzer Law" Background
ofArnerican Constitutional Law, Part 11, 42 HARv. L. REV. 365, 368 (1928)).
75 Other "common-law" nations that adopted constitutions with human rights and
provisions for judicial review frequently did so as part of the conditions by which they were
granted independence from colonial rule. Robert B. Seidman, Judicial Review and
Fundamental Freedoms in Anglophonic Independent Africa, 35 OHio ST. LJ. 820, 820-21
(1974); Paul, supra note 33, at 855.
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continuity in the amenability of common-law adjudication to judicial review.
The source of this continuity is most likely the role of the common-law judge
in policymaking. The common law's frank recognition of the policy-making
role of judges provided a framework both for the existence of multiple forms of
positive law (statutory and common law) as well as for the direct involvement
of judges in lawmaking. When judges are openly allowed the authority to
participate creatively in the processes of government, the stage is set for the
introduction of judicial review.
3. Recent Trends in the Common Law
At the same time the civil-law systems have been moving toward forms of
constitutional control of legislation, the common-law nations have been moving
toward more extensively codified legal systems. In these ways, the two legal
systems are beginning to converge. The traditional authority and independence
of the common-law judge has been reduced in recent years by the introduction
of broad and comprehensive legislation in those nations that adhere to the
common-law system.76 The common-law judge is now called upon to exercise
his or her authority more and more often in cases of statutory construction and
less frequently in cases of explicit judicial lawmaking. This shift in focus is
likely to be accompanied by an increasing judicial deference to the legislature
and diminution of the ability of the common-law judge to interpose his or her
authority against the will of the majority. 77
D. Summary
The civil-law tradition, in its classical form, severely restricted the ambit of
judges in deciding cases by relying heavily on principles of legislative
supremacy and legal positivism. In practice, the civil-law code system and the
rejection of precedent further limited judicial scope. While the modem civil
76 For a description of this proliferation of legislation, see generally GuIDo CALABRESI,
A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES (1982). See also LORD LESLIE SCARMAN, LAW
REFORM 47 (1968) (By 1967, "the bulk of the English law that matters ha[d] found its way
into the statute book.").
77 Conservative jurists point out, however, that American judges have been able to
maintain a modicum of operational independence even in the face of extensive statutory
development through the "freewheeling interpret[ation]" of statutes and the use of
"conveniently vague constitutional doctrines." See, e.g., RiCHARD POSNER, SEX AND
REASON 79-81 (1992) (noting the role of courts in moderating the effect of Victorian morals
legislation in America). To the extent that this is the case, the disempowerment of the
common-law judge by extensive legislative activity will be diluted.
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systems have been moving away from absolutism in these areas, this history
suggests limitations on the political capacity of civil-law nations to stomach
judicial interference, as well as to produce judges capable of exercising judicial
review. To the extent the new nations of Central and Eastern Europe draw
from the civil-law tradition, they will likely encounter similar difficulties. 78
Socialist legal tradition, which derived its conclusions theoretically rather
than historically, imposed restrictions on judicial behavior similar to those
associated with the civil-law principles of legislative supremacy. Countries that
were formerly socialist may therefore expect to have similar problems with
judicial review, even if they eschew relying upon the civil experience.
Unfortunately, the lack of a rule-of-law culture and a cadre of independent-
minded judges may limit the range of choices available to these countries in
developing forms of judicial review.
The common law, by way of contrast, is relevant to the new states of
Central and Eastern Europe as an intellectual force rather than as a direct
constraint or influence, and it will prove to be more a source of comparative
analysis than an immediate cultural antecedent. The common law offers the
new states a jurisprudence richer in judicial independence and legal hierarchical
theory, which is at the core of effective judicial review, than do the civil or
socialist legal-judicial traditions.
M1I. THE FORMS AND STRUCTURES OF JUDICIAL REVIEW
Once the determination to institute some form of judicial review has been
made, a number of secondary choices regarding the forms and structures of that
review will necessarily present themselves. 79 Of course, none of these choices
can be made independently. The choice of the courts to which competence to
exercise judicial review will be granted is perforce closely related to the choice
78 One commentator has already noted the influence of the civil-law traditions in at
least one former socialist country, Hungary. See Ethan Klingsberg, Judicial Review and
Hungary's Transition from Communism to Democracy: 77Te Constitutional Court, the
Continuity of Law, and the Redefinition of Property Rights, 1992 B.Y.U. L. REV. 41, 121
n.197. Klingsberg, in particular, notes the importance of a lack of precedent in Hungary's
civil-law practice and the presence of strong legal positivism. Id. at 121-25.
79 The classic study of comparative judicial review, though now a little dated, is
MAURO CAPPELLETTI, JUDICIAL REVIEW IN THE CONTEMPORARY WORLD (1971). For a more
recent study, see ALLEN R. BREWER-CARIAS, JuDIcIAL REVIEW IN COMPARATIVE LAW
(1989). This Article relies in large part upon Cappelletti's work for the categorization of the
various types of judicial review. It recognizes, however, that these categories imperfectly
capture the tremendous variety of forms of judicial review and are therefore merely a
starting point for investigation rather than a strictly limited menu of options.
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of the scope of the review power, and vice versa. Any attempt to distinguish
the choices analytically therefore runs the risk of appearing to limit the
available options to a series of binary decisions regarding each of the various
characteristics of judicial review. We have no interest in attempting to reduce
the richness of the options that are available to new nations (or old nations, for
that matter) in experimenting with the multitude of means by which judicial
review can be implemented. Instead, the purpose in providing analytic
distinctions between the various aspects of judicial review is to establish a
structure for discussion. Some of the implications for other choices will be
sketched out, but due to the fullness of the subject, there is no claim to
comprehensiveness.
A. The System of Judicial Review. Centralized or Diffuse?
1. Centralized and Diffuse Systems of Judicial Review
The first and most important decision regarding the exercise of judicial
review involves the judicial structure that will have the review authority. In this
respect, traditional scholarship has typically distinguished between two basic
models of court structure, which have been loosely labeled the American and
Austrian systems.80 While the distinction between the two systems has begun
to break down, they still represent fundamentally different approaches to the
problems of implementing judicial review.
The American, or "diffuse," system of judicial review relies upon the
constituent pieces of the ordinary judicial system to engage in judicial review.
In the United States, any lower court may make a decision regarding the
constitutionality of both legislation and administrative action, or the conformity
of a lower law to a statutory mandate. That decision is binding upon the parties
involved until reversed by a higher court. The American system, therefore,
allows a high degree of judicial control of constitutionality because judicial
resources are utilized to their maximum capacity. 8' The American system is
particularly popular in the common-law countries of the British
80 CAPPELLETI-I, supra note 79, at 46-51; see BREWER-CARiAs, supra note 79, at 177-
81.
81 The diffusion of judicial review authority in the United States is multiplied by the
presence of two judicial systems, state and federal, both of which have equal authority to
invalidate legislative and executive actions for incompatibility with constitutional norms.
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Commonwealth, including Canada, India, and Australia.8 2 It has also made
inroads in Latin American countries influenced by the U.S. model.83
The Austrian, or "centralized," system of judicial review, on the other
hand, relies upon a specialized court system, frequently a single constitutional
court, to exercise judicial review. The original model for the system was the
Austrian Constitution of 1920.84 Under the Austrian system, the general courts
are barred from making constitutional determinations, although they may be
allowed the authority to "certify" such questions to the constitutional court
when those questions arise in the course of ordinary litigation. 85
The distinction between the two systems has been decreasing somewhat in
recent years. In the United States, for example, the use of the writ of certiorari
has transformed the Supreme Court into an institution whose function is almost
exclusively constitutional.86 The lower courts, however, still maintain the
traditional combination of the decision of constitutional and non-constitutional
issues.87
The features of the three legal-judicial traditions discussed above are
directly relevant to the choice of a centralized or a diffuse system of judicial
review. The Austrian model has typically been the preferred choice of the civil-
law nations. Cappelletti has assigned three reasons for this preference, each of
which relates to characteristic features of the civil-law system.88 First, the civil
law's tradition of legislative supremacy is partially appeased by the restriction
of judicial review to a single specialized tribunal.89 Second, because the civil-
law nations generally reject the notion of precedent, a diffuse system of judicial
review poses the specter of radically inconsistent decisions being rendered on
82 See CAPPELLETTI, supra note 79, at 47.
83 Argentina, Brazil, El Salvador, Venezuela, and Mexico all have had forms of the
American diffuse system of judicial review. Rosenn, supra note 4, at 788.
84 CAPPELLETTI, supra note 79, at 46.
85 See, e.g., F.R.G. CONST. art. 100 (1949) (describing certification procedure to
German Constitutional Court), reprinted in FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY, VI
CONSTrrrUrlONS OF THE COUiNrRIES OF THE WORLD (Oceana) 131 (1991); Pergola & Del
Duca, supra note 12, at 603-04 (describing certification procedure to the Italian
Constitutional Court).
86 See McWHINNEY, supra note 60, at 235 ("[Flor all practical purposes since the
reforms effected by the Judiciary Act of 1925, the United States Supreme Court has become
a specialist public law or constitutional tribunal."); CAPPELLETTI, supra note 79, at 67.
87 See, e.g., State v. A, B, C, D & E, 847 P.2d 455 (Wash. 1993) (en bane) (state
court deciding both state statutory issue and federal constitutional issue as to mandatory IV
testing of juvenile sex offenders).
88 See CAPPELLETTI, supra note 79, at 53-66.
89 Id. at 54-64.
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identical constitutional issues. 90 Finally, the legal-judicial culture in which
civil-law judges operate limits the number of judges available who can
effectively exercise judicial review. 91
2. Constitutional Human Rights in Central and Eastern Europe. The
Dilemma of Ambition and Inadequate Resources
To date, the Austrian model has also been the most popular choice of the
new nations of Central and Eastern Europe. Poland 92 and Hungary, 93 for
example, have already established single constitutional courts based on the
Austrian model. Russia's constitutional court has achieved prominence in its
short existence. 94 Variations on the Austrian model are also being considered
in Romania, 95 Azerbaijan, 96 and Ukraine.97 The preference of the new states
for the Austrian model is not surprising, given the influence of the civil-law
system and the similar effects of the civil tradition and socialist legal theory. 98
At least one nation in Eastern Europe, Latvia, is considering the adoption
of a constitutional system that shares the American feature of vesting ultimate
responsibility for constitutional issues in a supreme court rather than in a
90 Id. While such inconsistencies are possible under the American system, the
availability of precedential decisions by appellate courts eliminates the danger in its most
serious instances. When inconsistencies exist in the American system between the lower
courts and eventually reach a certain level of importance, a higher court will typically
assume jurisdiction and provide an authoritative resolution. Id.
9 1 Id. at 60.
92 POL. CONST. art. 33a (1991), reprinted in POLAND, XV CONSTITUTIONS OF THE
COUNTRIES OFTHE WORLD (Oceana) 17 (1991).
93 HUNG. CoNST. ch. IV, § 32/A (1949), reprinted in THE REPUBLIC OF HUNGARY,
VII[ CONSTMIONS OFTHE COUNTRIES OFTHE WORLD (Oceana) 13 (1990).
94 The Russian Constitutional Court came into existence on July 12, 1991, when the
Congress of People's Deputies adopted the Law on the Constitutional Court. For a detailed
description of one of the court's earliest and most important cases, the so-called "Trial of
the Communist Party," see David Remnick, The Trial of the Old Regime, THE NEw
YORKER, Nov. 30, 1992, at 104. See also supra notes 47-51 and accompanying text.
95 ROM. CONST. arts. 140, 144 (1991), reprinted in ROMANIA, CONSTITUTIONS OF THE
COUNTRIES OFTHE WORLD (Oceana) 34-35 (1992).
96 See Concept for tei Constitution of the Republic of Azerbaijan, § VI (copy on file
with the Ohio State Law Journal).
97 See UKRAINIAN CONST. art. 214 (proposed) (copy on file with the Ohio State Law
Journal).
98 See supra notes 47-51 and accompanying text for a fuller discussion of these
similarities.
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specialized constitutional court.99 The Latvian system, however, would not
share the diffuse character of the American system with respect to
constitutional review. 100
While there are significant incentives leading these countries to introduce
the Austrian system, there are important reasons for the new nations to
consider the American model of judicial review. First, the American system
may provide a superior design for generating more carefully considered
constitutional decisions. There is an important benefit to be reaped from the
very number of decisions on a constitutional question. By allowing significant
constitutional issues to "percolate" up through the system, the U.S. Supreme
Court, for example, enables itself to decide those issues only after they have
already received the consideration of a number of other judges. Not only does
the Court receive the benefit of the wisdom of the previous decisions, but it is
insulated from the obligation to decide simple (though important) or trivial
(though difficult) cases. Theoretically, only when a case is both important and
difficult does the U.S. Supreme Court exercise authoritative review.
Second, and most importantly, the Austrian system is more properly
geared toward a limited form of "structural" judicial review rather than toward
the protection of individual rights. If the purpose of judicial review is merely to
enforce the constitutional separation of powers and to maintain the proper
relation between the various public entities in a federal republic, then a central
constitutional court may be able to adequately perform its task. If, on the other
hand, the purpose of judicial review is understood to be the protection of
individual human rights, then a single constitutional court is unlikely to be
capable of responding to the number of constitutional complaints.
This potential inadequacy of constitutional courts in protecting individual
rights is a serious problem. Many of the proposed and existing constitutions in
the new nations of Central and Eastern Europe are fairly ambitious in the scope
of the rights that they protect. 10 1 On the one hand, it will be difficult, if not
99 See Republic of Latvia Law on Judicial Power, art. 9 (copy on file with the Ohio
State Law Journal). Interestingly, the motivation for this choice may be less related to
structure than to concern about judicial authority. The Chief Justice of the Latvian Supreme
Court, for example, has expressed the view that a divided court system could undermine
respect for the decisions of the Supreme Court.
100 Id. (Latvian Supreme Court has exclusive authority to pass constitutional
judgments).
101 See, e.g., UKRAINIAN CONST. art. 29, art. 22 (proposed) (protecting free speech)
(copy on file with the Ohio State Law Journal); Concept for the Constitution of the Republic
of Azerbaijan, § III (protecting the right to a "fitting standard of living" and various
ecological and civil rights) (copy on file with the Ohio State Law Journal); Cutler &
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impossible, for constitutional courts to begin to enforce these rights, much less
to develop principled bodies of jurisprudence regarding them. On the other
hand, the civil and socialist law traditions of these nations make it difficult to
adopt fully the American system of diffuse judicial review. Thus, there is a
powerful tension between the desires of the new states with regard to the
protection of individual rights and the capabilities of their judiciaries in
effectively providing that protection.
3. Potential Nonjudicial Solutions to the Individual Rights Dilemma
While a review of the potential resolution of this tension is beyond the
scope of this Article, there are certain intermediate solutions to the dilemma
posed by the need to enforce individual rights in nations without the judicial
resources to adopt the American structure of judicial review. One of the most
popular alternatives to judicial review is the institution of the ombudsperson. 10 2
In its classic form, this institution is an independent agent or agency whose
purpose is to inquire into the administration of government, usually at the
behest of individuals aggrieved by that administration. 0 3 The ombudsperson is
most familiar in its Scandinavian form, where it exists in all four Scandinavian
nations, but has been established in nations as disparate as New Zealand' 04 and
Poland.' 0 5 A version of the ombudsperson has also appeared in embryonic
form in Great Britain. 106
Schwartz, supra note 5, at 532-36 (describing breadth of constitutional rights in the Czech
and Slovak Federal Republic).
102 For a fairly comprehensive description of the ombudsperson in European law, see
WALTER GELLHORN, OMBUDSMEN AND OTHERS (1966). Gellhorn's treatment is thorough,
colorful, and insightful, though now substantially dated.
103 Ombudspersons often also have authority to institute proceedings on their own
initiative. See, e.g., Ewa Letowska, The Polish Ombudsman (The Commissioner for the
Protecdon of Cvil Rights), 39 INT'L & CoMP. L.Q. 206, 207 (1990) (stating that Polish
Civil Rights Commissioner may act on own initiative); GELLHORN, supra note 102, at 75
(stating that Finnish ombudsmen may initiate investigations).
104 See GELLHORN, supra note 102, at 91-153 (discussing ombudsperson in New
Zealand).
105 See generally Letowska, supra note 103.
106 For a description of the British Parliamentary Commissioner, see Gavin Drewry &
Carol Harlow, A 'Cutting Edge'? 77e Parliamentary Conmmissioner and MPs, 53 MoD. L.
REV. 745 (1990). According to Drewry & Harlow, however, there is still a fair amount of
dispute as to whether the Commissioner is a true ombudsperson in the Scandinavian
tradition or is merely a servant of the House of Commons in fulfilling its obligations to
constituents. Id. at 765.
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The ombudsperson may be superior to a constitutional court in the
protection of individual rights because the ombudsperson has a greater capacity
to hear individual complaints outside of ordinary litigation. As a result, the
ombudsperson may be involved in a broader array of interactions with
government officials and the public than would a constitutional court. This
greater flexibility may allow the ombudsperson to have a more pronounced
practical effect on the behavior of government and even upon public
opinion.10 7
The ombudsperson is usually limited, however, to being only an
investigatory agent who lacks the authority to independently provide remedies
for government misbehavior. The Polish Commissioner for the Protection of
Civil Rights, for example, has the authority only to request the assistance of
official bodies, including the power to bring cases before the constitutional
court.108 Also, because the ombudsperson responds to individual complaints,
the institution runs the danger of becoming an exclusive spokesperson for
particularly aggrieved segments of society, such as prisoners, to the exclusion
of the rest. 109
Another alternative to judicial review in protecting individual rights is the
authority of the procurator, or public prosecutor. While relatively unfamiliar to
legal scholars in the West, the procurator, who is perhaps most similar to the
Western notion of the attorney general or prosecutor general, plays a relatively
important role in several Eastern nations in supervising the administration and
constitutionality of the laws. 110 In Azerbaijan, for example, the proposed
107 See GELLHORN, supra note 102, at 77 (The repeated interventions of Swedish
ombudspersons "have helped mold public opinion concerning such diverse things as free
speech, freedom of religion, police restrictions, and penology.").
108 See Letowska, supra note 103, at 207-08.
109 This was the experience of the Finnish ombudsperson in the early 1960s.
According to Gellhorn, the evidence "strongly supports the opinion that the Ombudsman is
more 'the prisoners' man' than 'the people's man.'" GELLHORN, supra note 102, at 66; see
also Letowska, supra note 103, at 211-12.
110 The procurator also looms large in the legal systems of certain Latin American
nations. In Costa Rica, for example, the Procurator General is considered to play a large
role in the enforcement of constitutional guarantees. See Barker, supra note 4, at 267-68.
The potential scope of the procurator's authority is well demonstrated by the
authority granted to the Spanish public prosecutor. Pursuant to the Spanish Constitution:
IT]he Public Prosecutor, without prejudice to the functions entrusted to other
organs, has the mission of promoting the action of justice in defense of legality,
the rights of citizens and the public interest guarded by the law, ex offcio or on
petition by interested parties, as well as watch over the independence of the Courts
and to procure before them the satisfaction of social interest.
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institution of the procurator would have the authority to make recommendations
to the Azerbaijani Constitutional Court regarding the constitutionality of
legislation."' As a guardian of individual constitutional rights, the procurator
enjoys an advantage over the ombudsperson in typically having larger
institutional resources with which to respond to constitutional problems.
However, because the procurator usually functions as a prosecutor as well, its
relationship to the government may be too close to ensure the independence
necessary to provide an adequate safeguard for individual rights.
B. The Effect of Judicial Review. Erga Omnes or Inter Partes?
A second choice faced by a nation developing a system of judicial review is
the extent to which constitutional decisions will be binding. Judicial decisions
may be binding upon all those subject to the issuing court's jurisdiction (erga
omnes), or alternatively, they may affect only the parties to the case in which
they arise (inter partes).112
In the United States, people are most familiar with erga omnes
decisionmaking. 113 Principally, the American comfort with this system derives
from its experience with the processes of common-law adjudication. Under the
common law, judicial decisions that make law are accepted as part of the
ordinary process of judging. By contrast, the classical civil-law system rejected
the principle that judges are authorized to make law and, therefore, eschewed
the erga omnes application of judicial decisions.1 14 If a court is only applying
the law laid down by the legislature, the theory goes, then there can be nothing
in the decision which can add to or modify the law as it stood prior to the
decision. Because the result only applies to the parties, the effect of the decision
is merely interpartes.
The choice as to the effect of judicial review is chiefly related to the
structure of the judicial system. If a nation elects only to have a single
SPAIN CONST. art. 124(1) (1978), reprinted in SPAIN, XVII CONSTUrIONs OF THE
CouNTRIEs OF THE WORLD (Oceana) 69 (1991).
I11 See Draft Law on the Procuracy of the Republic of Azerbaijan, art. 8, § 6 (copy on
file with the Ohio State Law Journal).
112 See CAPPELLETTI, supra note 79, at 85-88.
113 The fact that most U.S. courts are limited in their jurisdictional reach (e.g., the
decisions of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit are not binding upon the
district courts of Florida), is not to the contrary. Within the jurisdictional limitation of a
given court, judicial decisions on constitutional matters are erga onmes unless overruled by
a higher court.
114 See Barker, supra note 4, at 254 n.30.
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constitutional court responsible for all constitutional adjudication, it will be
difficult for that nation to maintain only an inter partes rule. It would be
anomalous, as well as burdensome, for a constitutional court to repeatedly
decide the same constitutional issues only because the parties to the cases
differed. 115 For this reason, some nations that have adopted unitary
constitutional courts have provided specifically for the erga omnes effect of
constitutional decisions. 116 Other nations have provided that statutes which are
declared unconstitutional in one proceeding are "nullified," which effectively
gives the decisions erga omnes effect.1 17
C. The Timing of Judicial Review. A priori or incidental?
A third choice is whether judicial review shall occur prior to the
promulgation and implementation of a law or executive decree, or only
following the implementation of the law or decree. 118 Under one system,
known as a priori review, parties are allowed to challenge the propriety-
usually with respect to constitutional norms-of statutes and executive decrees
in specialized proceedings prior to the promulgation and application of those
statutes and decrees. 119 This form of review has a certain hypothetical quality
115 This problem would be particularly acute with respect to the criminal law. Under
an interpartes rule, each person convicted under a law later deemed to be unconstitutional
would be required to initiate a separate litigation for release.
116 For example, in Russia, "[diecisions of the RF Constitutional Court shall. . . be
binding on all territory of the Russian Federation. DRAFr CONSTITUTION OF THE RUSSIAN
FEDERATION art. 103(6) (1992), reprinted in THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION, XV CONSTITUTIONS
OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD (Oceana) 48 (1993). Germany has also specifically
provided for a partial erga omnes effect, making decisions of its constitutional court binding
upon public authorities but not necessarily private parties. Zeidler, supra note 34, at 520.
See also SPAIN CONST. 164(1) (1978), reprinted in SPAIN, XVIII CONSTITUTIONS OF THE
COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD (Oceana) 82 (1991) (decisions of the Spanish Constitutional
Court which declare the unconstitutionality of a law "shall be fully binding on everybody").
117 The Costa Rican Constitution provides that statutes which are unconstitutional are
"absolutely void." COSTA RICA CONST. art. 10 (1977), reprinted in COSTA RICA, IV
CONSTITUrIONS OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD (Oceana) 3 (1982). See also HUNG.
CoNsT. ch. IV, art. § 32/A(2) (1949), reprinted in THE REPUBLIC OF HUNGARY, VIII
CONSTITTIONS OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD (Oceana) 13 (1990) (declaration of
unconstitutionality by the Hungarian Constitutional Court "annuls" a statute); ITAL. CONST.
art. 136 (1947), reprinted in ITALY, CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD
(Oceana) 82 (1987) (laws declared unconstitutional by the Italian Constitutional Court
"ceasel' to have effect").
118 See CAPPELLETTI, supra note 79, at 69-77.
119 See, e.g., art. 61, of the French Constitution:
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to it because review takes place in the abstract without a concrete set of facts to
which the challenged law or regulation is applied. Typically, standing to initiate
such a proceeding is limited to governmental bodies. In France, a priori
reference of laws to the Conseil constitutionnel is limited to the President, the
Prime Minister, the President of the Senate or National Assembly, or any
group of sixty senators or deputies. 120
Alternatively, parties may be limited to challenging government actions
only in the context of ordinary litigation, that is, when such a challenge is
"incidental" to the litigation. Under the incidental system, a constitutional
violation may comprise the gravamen of a plaintiff's complaint, but the
presence of the constitutional question is only incidental to the harm which has
occasioned the litigation.
The distinction between a priori and incidental review is closely related to
the distinction between "abstract" and "concrete" judicial review. Abstract
judicial review is a process by which the conformity of laws with higher norms
takes place in the abstract, without the trappings of ordinary litigation, though
it may take place after the promulgation of the challenged law. Abstract review
shares the hypothetical quality of a priori review, and except for its availability
after promulgation of a law, is functionally equivalent. Concrete review, like
incidental review, occurs only within the context of a specific case whose
resolution requires decision of the constitutional question. In practical terms, it
is proper to contrast incidental review with both abstract and a priori systems
of judicial review.
Unlike the effect of judicial review, the choice of a priori or incidental
review is not highly correlated with the division between the civil-law and
common-law countries or the choice of a centralized or diffuse system of
judicial review. The federal judiciary in the United States, for example, has
always exhibited a strong aversion to forms of a priori review, because they are
Organic laws, before their promulgation, and regulations of the procedure of the
Parliamentary Assemblies, before they come into application, must be submitted to the
Constitutional Council, which shall rule on their constitutionality.
FR. CoNsT. art. 61 (1958), reprinted in FRANCE, VI CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COUNTRIES OF
THE WORLD (Oceana) 40 (1988); see also ROM. CoNsT. art. 144(a) (1991), reprinted in
ROMANIA, CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD (Oceana) 34-35 (Romanian
Constitutional Court may pass on the constitutionality of laws prior to promulgation).
120 See Vroom, supra note 28, at 276. Similarly, in Germany, initiation of abstract
review of legislative acts, while not prior to promulgation, is limited to the federal
government, a state government, or one-third of the federal legislature, the Bundestag.
F.R.G. CONST. art. 93(1)(2) (1991), reprinted in FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY, supra
note 85, at 127.
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similar to the issuance of "advisory opinions." 121 Canada, however, maintains
both a common-law tradition and a healthy and robust system of 'reference
jurisdiction" whose operation is similar to that of a system of abstract
review.122 On the civil-law side, Germany's constitutional court exercises both
abstract review (abstrakte Normenkontrolle) at the behest of public agencies
and concrete review (konkrete Normenkontrolle) emerging out of the ordinary
litigation process. 123
The choice of a priori or incidental judicial review is more likely to be
reflective of the purposes that judicial review is designed to serve. For
example, a priori or abstract review is likely to be more consistent with
separation of powers or federalism review than it is with the protection of
individual human rights. 124 Conversely, incidental review may be less effective
in dealing with separation-of-powers problems. 125
One very interesting feature of systems of a priori and abstract review is
the degree to which they allow for mechanisms of constitutional dialogue
between the judicial, legislative, and executive branches of government. In the
United States, with its highly formalized system of incidental review, the
121 The U.S. tradition of declining advisory opinions began with Chief Justice Jay's
refusal to answer certain questions posed to the U.S. Supreme Court by then Secretary of
State Thomas Jefferson. See 3 CORRESPONDENCE AND PUBLIC PAPERS OF JOHN JAY 486-89
(Johnson ed. 1891); 10 SPARKS, WRITINGS OF WASHINGTON 542-45 (1836), reprinted in
HART & WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 65-67 (3d ed.
1988). See also Muskrat v. United States, 219 U.S. 346 (1911) (refusing to entertain
hypothetical lawsuit despite Congressional authorization). This aversion has persisted despite
the fact that several individual states provide advisory opinion jurisdiction for their supreme
courts. See, e.g., COLO. CoNsT. art. VI, § 3; MASs. CoNsT. art. 2, pt. 2, ch. 3; ME.
CONST. art. VI, § 3; N.H. CONST. art. 74, pt. 2; R.I. CONsT. art. 10, § 3; S.D. CONST. art.
5, § 5.
122 See generally James L. Huffmnan & MardiLyn Saathoff, Advisory Opinions and
Canadian Constitutional Development: 7he Supreme Court's Reference Jurisdiction, 74
MINN. L. REV. 1251 (1990) (describing and praising exercise of reference jurisdiction in
Canada).
123 See F.R.G. CONST. art. 93 (1991), reprinted in FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY,
supra note 85, at 127; Kommers, supra note 27, at 841.
124 See Huffman & Saathoff, supra note 122, at 1297 ("Given the predominance of
federalism issues in reference cases, the reference procedure has played an important role in
the constitutional definition of the Canadian federal system."). One commentator, however,
has asserted that the French experience is proving the compatibility of a priori review with
protecting individual freedom. Vroom, supra note 28, at 266.
125 See Huffman & Saathoff, supra note 122, at 1312 ("In contrast, the case law
approach is confined to specific factual controversies, litigants, and remedies; it may not
provide a sufficient frame of reference to prevent erosion of a federation's jurisdictional
spheres.").
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exchange between the judiciary and the political branches regarding the
constitutionality of various measures is extremely limited. In reviewing the
constitutionality of legislative or executive activity, American courts address
constitutional questions on the assumption that the judicial decision on the issue
is the last word on the subject. 126 If the challenged measure is deemed to be
unconstitutional, it is invalidated; if not, it is upheld, and the court's decision
with respect to constitutionality is final. 127 In the course of its decision, the
court may occasionally invite the legislature or executive to reconsider the
measure in light of the holding, but that is the extent of the exchange. 128
Certain American judicial doctrines, like the clear statement rule, 129 may serve
a minimal dialogic role, but these are relatively trivial. 130
In contrast, systems of a priori and abstract review offer much richer
opportunities for interaction between the various branches of government.
Unlike incidental judicial review, these forms of review do not arise in the
126 See Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 18 (1958) ("[Tihe federal judiciary is supreme
in the exposition of the Constitution, and that principle has ever since been respected by this
Court and the Country as a permanent and indispensable feature of our constitutional
system.").
127 One commentator has argued in favor of eliminating the finality of U.S. Supreme
Court decisions in certain circumstances. See Daniel Conkle, Nonoriginalist Constitutional
Rights and the Problem of Judicial Finality, 13 HASTrNGS CONST. L.Q. 9 (1985) (arguing
for nonfinality of decisions based on "nonoriginalist" individual rights).
128 Even this possibility is generally considered unrealistic in the present U.S. system,
as Congress seems relatively loath to take action following a judicial interpretation of a
statute. See John Hart Ely, Another Such Victory: Constitutional Theory and Practice in a
World Where Counts Are no Differentfrom Legislatures, 77 VA. L. REV. 747, 861 (1991).
129 According to the clear statement rule, the Supreme Court will invalidate executive
action that may infringe upon constitutional rights when there is doubt as to whether
Congress had actually authorized the executive's behavior. In Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116
(1958), for example, the Court invalidated the Secretary of State's denial of certain
passports. The Court was concerned that Congress had not intended to grant the Secretary
"unbridled discretion" in this area when such discretion could trench on the constitutional
right to travel. Decisions like the one in Dulles facilitate constitutional discussion between
the Court and Congress because they leave open the possibility for Congress to reconsider
its decision in light of the possible constitutional infringement. Only if Congress makes its
intentions explicit will the Court actually address the question of whether a constitutional
violation has taken place.
130 Alexander Bickel's famous "passive virtues" may perform a role in generating
space for a limited form of "dialogue" between the U.S. Supreme Court and Congress. See
generally ALEXANDER BIcKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 111-98 (1962). By
employing doctrines such as ripeness and mootness, the Court may effectively delay
decision in certain cases, in the hopes that Congress (or the responsible state legislature) will
remedy the constitutional deficiency on its own initiative.
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context of a specific case. Without the time pressure associated with the need
for a decision, they allow for the possibility of a period of exchanges between
the judiciary, the legislature, and the executive branches. A priori review also
has the advantage of occurring prior to the promulgation of a statute or
executive decree. Because the questioned law is not yet in effect, all of the
relevant actors have substantially more leeway in developing solutions to any
constitutional problems.
The new nations of Central and Eastern Europe have already begun to
exploit this aspect of a priori and abstract review as a method of defusing
constitutional dispute. The constitutional dialogue between the judiciary and the
legislature is particularly developed in Poland. There, the Constitutional
Tribunal may review legislative acts a priori on the motion of certain
government agents. 131  If the tribunal makes a determination of
unconstitutionality, the law is returned directly to the Polish legislature, the
Sejm, for reconsideration. 132 If the parliament re-enacts the law with a specified
qualified majority, the new law is promulgated despite the tribunal's
determination of unconstitutionality. The new law is then treated as an
amendment to the Polish Constitution, so the unconstitutionality of the law is in
fact removed.' 33 Thus, in Poland, the dialogue between the court and the
legislature in considering the constitutionality of legislation is codified in
positive law and is part of the constitutional amendment process.
Similar dialogic systems are in place in other nations with constitutional
courts. In Germany, for example, the Federal Constitutional Court has in fact
permitted unconstitutional laws to remain in effect pending legislative action. In
such cases, the unconstitutional statute is only invalidated if the legislature fails
to act by a given deadline. 134
These forms of extensive constitutional dialogue have several advantages
when contrasted with the more limited American system. First, they extend the
hope of forestalling constitutional violations before they occur. If constitutional
violations can be addressed a priori, or in the abstract, they perhaps can be
remedied before any real injury is inflicted. Second, such dialogue may also
foster a higher degree of constitutional responsibility on the part of legislators.
By being required to respond to constitutional concerns, legislators will be
131 See POL. CONST. art. 27(4) (1991) (President may submit laws to Constitutional
Tribunal for examination), reprinted in POLAND, supra note 92, at 12.
132 POL. CONST. art. 33a(2) ("Judgments of the Constitutional Tribunal on non-
conformity of laws are subject to examination by the Sejrn."), reprinted in POLAND, supra
note 92, at 17.
133 See Hartwig, supra note 2, at 455.
134 See Zeidler, supra note 34, at 517 (describing the dialogue between court and
Bundestag in resolving the constitutional aspects of income taxation).
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introduced to constitutional principles whose impact they may not have
otherwise considered. 135 Finally, constitutional dialogue of this sort may
increase the efficiency of the legislature in performing its own task. A series of
exchanges between the court, the legislature, and the executive may help focus
a variety of the issues surrounding a given enactment and result in better
legislation. The legislature may also benefit from a precise analysis of the
present state of the law by legal experts in the judiciary.136
D. Standing
One of the most important choices facing a nation instituting judicial
review is defining the parties who will have the ability to trigger review.
Unlike the previous choices discussed above, there is an almost unlimited set of
options with regard to this issue. The choices range from limited standing
restricted to a few organs of the government to broad standing allowed for any
person who is aggrieved by an allegedly unconstitutional act.
The issue of standing is closely related to the choice of judicial system and
the timing of judicial review, primarily due to concerns regarding the burdens
that are to be placed upon the judiciary. In a system that relies upon a single
constitutional court, it may be necessary to limit the parties who will have
access to the court's judgment. In Bulgaria, for example, individual access is
denied to the constitutional court for precisely this reason. 137 One commentator
has predicted that in Hungary, where access to the constitutional court is open
to everyone, including foreigners, regulation of constitutional complaints will
be necessary in the future. 138
When review is available on an a priori basis, it may be necessary to limit
the number of parties that have legal authority to bring a challenge prior to the
135 According to one commentator, in France "[liegislative consideration of
constitutional norms has thus increased in proportion to the Conseil Constitunionnel's
activism in pronouncing these norms." Vroom, supra note 28, at 320.
136 As Lord Campbell once reportedly advised his fellow members of the House of
Lords: "[You] may be called on, in your legislative capacity, to change the law and before
doing so it is proper that you should be satisfied beyond a doubt what the law really is." In
re References by the Governor-General in Council, 43 S.C.R. 537, 549 (Can. 1910).
137 See BULG. CONST. art. 150 (1991) (limiting access to constitutional court to
government officials), reprinted in REPUBLIC OF BuLGAIA, III CoNsTrruTIoNs OF THE
COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD (Oceana) 116 (1992). But see BULG. CONST. art. 120(2)
(allowing broad access to judicial review for individuals affected by administrative actions).
138 See Hartwig, supra note 2, at 461. A similar prediction has been made with respect
to the constitutional court of the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic and its broad standing
rules. Cutler & Schwartz, supra note 5, at 540.
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promulgation of a law. If any citizen had the right to challenge laws prior to
promulgation, most laws might never be enacted. As noted above, in France
and in Germany, a priori review may be initiated only by a few select members
of the government. 139
In a system with a diffusion of responsibility for judicial review, however,
standing may be more broadly available due to the number of courts that have
authority to decide constitutional cases. The United States, for example, has
fairly broad standing rules that effectively allow individuals to bring abstract
challenges. 140 As of yet, the American court system has not been markedly
overburdened with constitutional cases. 141
IV. THE RELATIONSHIP OF DEMOCRACY TO JUDICIAL REViEW
Turning from the practical aspects of institutional design, a comparative
analysis of judicial review is properly concluded with some brief commentary
on one of the basic theoretical questions associated with judicial review. This
question is the relationship of the institution of judicial review (in its various
forms) to the general notion of democracy. As described below, the classical
understanding of the problem has been that judicial review is inherently "anti-
democratic" and must, therefore, be "resolved" with democratic theory in
some coherent and legitimate fashion. The question as to whether such a
"counter-majoritarian" difficulty exists, and if it does, what is to be done about
it, are key to the operation of a system of judicial review. While these
questions may appear to be highly abstract, they do, in fact, relate directly to
the practical enterprise of establishing a system of judicial review.
Of course, this Article does not presume to engage in a complete
canvassing of the voluminous literature available on the relationship between
judicial review and representative government. 142 Instead, its discussion of
139 See supra note 120 and accompanying text; see also ROM. CONST. art. 144(a)
(1991), reprinted in ROMANIA, CONsTrruTIoNs OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD (Oceana)
34-35 (1992) (right to initiate a priori review limited to certain governmental bodies).
140 See, e.g., United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures
(SCRAP), 412 U.S. 669 (1973) (allowing standing to law students in challenging
environmental effects of railway surcharges on recreational facilities in Washington, D.C.).
But see Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 112 S. Ct. 2130, 2136-37 (1992) (describing
potentially more stringent standing analysis).
141 The claim that the U.S. courts, particularly the federal, are overburdened is
frequently heard, but this is more likely due to the tremendous number of drug cases than to
the breadth of American standing law.
142 This literature has been described as "library-size[d]." Cappelletti, supra note 3, at
410 n.6.
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these issues is primarily to demonstrate some of the practical consequences that
this academic debate may have for nations attempting to develop their own
systems of judicial review. In presenting these issues, this Article divides a
number of theories of judicial review into two categories: those that focus on
the apparent tension between judicial review and democracy and those that
perceive judicial review as an important or necessary feature of democracy. To
a great extent, these categories are naive and artificial because the theories that
they encompass are complex and often overlap in significant ways.
Functionally, however, they capture a great deal about the variety of theories of
judicial review and democracy.
A. Traditional "Counter-Majoritarian" Thought
1. The Operational Role of Courts
Traditional constitutional theory has posited that the institution of judicial
review is inherently antidemocratic in that it is employed primarily to thwart
the will of a democratically elected and "representative" legislature. In
Alexander Bickel's words, "nothing ... can alter the essential reality that
judicial review is a deviant institution in the American democracy." 143 In order
for the institution to be legitimated, therefore, some reconciliation between its
antidemocratic nature and the general theory of democracy must be achieved.
In this view, judicial review may survive only if it performs some salutary
purpose within the general framework of democracy. The classic formulation
of the task of legitimizing judicial review was also provided by Bickel:
The search must be for a function . . . which is peculiarly suited to the
capabilities of the courts; which will not likely be performed elsewhere if the
courts do not assume it; which can be so exercised as to be acceptable in a
society that generally shares Judge Hand's satisfaction in a "sense of common
venture"; which will be effective when needed; and whose discharge by the
courts will not lower the quality of the other departments' performance by
denuding them of the dignity and burden of their own responsibility. 144
This enterprise has taken a number of different forms. In general, the
arguments in favor of judicial review, despite its apparent conflict with
democratic principles, fall into two categories: those that attempt to fulfill the
task set out by Bickel and those that attempt to resolve the problem by
reformulating it so as to eliminate the difficulty altogether.
143 BIcKEL, supra note 130, at 18.
144 BcKEL, supra note 130, at 24.
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2. The Preservation of Principle
Bickel's own response to the task he set forth was the recognition of judges
as performing a unique role in the elucidation and application of "principle" to
political problems. For Bickel, one of the fundamental problems with
representative government was reconciling the need for "expediency" (the
solutions to the immediate problems of the day) with the need for "principle"
(the underlying values on which a given society is based). These needs were
reconciled by giving judges the authority to invalidate the expedient solutions
created by the political branches on grounds of principle. Judges, particularly
those sitting on the Supreme Court, were expert at this task because "[j]udges
have, or should have, the leisure, the training, and the insulation to follow the
ways of the scholar in pursuing the ends of government."1 45
Bickel's resolution of the counter-majoritarian difficulty has some
interesting implications for the institution of judicial review. First, in the new
states of Central and Eastern Europe, it suggests the desirability of a centralized
constitutional court. If the purpose of judicial review is to infuse the political
process with principle, then the power should be exercised only by those with
the independence to occasionally oppose the will of the majority. As we have
seen, in the classical civil-law system and the socialist legal system, judges
typically do not have the training to exercise such independence. A unitary
court, however, could be comprised of those unique individuals who could,
when circumstances demand, stand up to the legislature and the executive.
Furthermore, ordinary judges are less likely to have the requisite leisure to
engage in the sort of philosophical inquiries that Bickel demands of judges
exercising judicial review.
Second, Bickel's solution strongly suggests that career judges may not
always be the most appropriate choices for judicial review authority. Such
individuals will be experienced in the day-to-day minutiae of judicial
administration but may not be qualified for the highly abstract and
philosophical task of deriving the fundamental values of a society. The
appropriate Bickellian constitutional court, then, might be comprised of
individuals from a variety of academic and philosophical backgrounds. For this
reason, perhaps, many of this nation's most famous Supreme Court justices
have been academics rather than career judges. 146
145 BICKEL, supra note 130, at 25-26.
146 Oliver Wendell Holmes, Louis Brandeis, Harlan Fiske Stone, Felix Frankfurter,
and William 0. Douglas, for example, all taught law prior to their judicial appointments.
See SmINEY H. Ascii, THE SuP, EME CouRT AND rrs GRrAT JUSTICEs 83, 107, 128, 160, 211
(1971).
[Vol. 54:559
JUDICIAL REVIEW
Finally, Bickel's judicial function is highly compatible with abstract and a
priori review. The chief disadvantage of a priori review is its disassociation
from concrete facts, but if the purpose of review is to ensure conformity with
abstract social principles, then the existence of concrete facts may not be
essential. Statutes could be effectively reviewed for conformity with principle
because those principles are by definition abstract.
3. The Fallacy of Democracy
An alternative response to the "counter-majoritarian difficulty" is simply to
deny that democracy has any meaning, or, at least, any meaning to the modem
world. Some constitutional experts note that many features of modem
government are not particularly democratic and argue that we should not be
particularly concerned about the "non-democraticness" of any particular one
feature, including judicial review. 147 These experts point out that most modem
governments bear little resemblance to the classic ideal of democracy, even in a
representative form. 148 In their view, modem government is comprised of a
heterogeneous amalgam of officials who fall along a fairly wide spectrum of
public responsibility; it is not a "democracy."
The U.S. government, for example, exhibits a number of institutions and
practices that are not strictly democratic. Most obviously, the members of the
U.S. Senate are elected not democratically on the basis of population, but
geographically as representatives of their respective states. 149 Furthermore, the
large administrative bureaucracies characteristic of modem government are not
elected and are almost totally unrepresentative. Given the pervasive presence of
nondemocratic government, theorists conclude that any concerns one might
147 See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, Foreword: The Vanishing Constitution, 103 HARV.
L. REv. 43, 74-77 (1989).
148 See Allan Ides, The American Democracy and Judicial Review, 33 ARIZ. L. REV.
1, 6 (1991) ("[Classic participatory democracy-even a representative version-is at best a
theoretical ideal, unattainable in the modern, highly populated, transnational world.");
HARRY WELLINGrON, INTERPRETING THE CoNSTrrurioN 28 (1990) ("If we move from the
deep structure of the Constitution to regular and accepted practice within, say, the
legislative branches of the federal government, we find further dilution of any simple notion
of majority rule or electoral accountability.").
149 Of course, senators are elected democratically within their geographic
constituencies, though even this was not the case when the U.S. Constitution was ratified.
Prior to the ratification of the 17th Amendment, senators were elected by their state
legislatures. See U.S. CoNs'r. art. 1, § 3.
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have about judicial review should not derive from a suspicion of its inherent
"antidemocratic" nature.150
The results of this recognition of the nondemocratic aspects of modem
government are largely empty regarding the appropriate scope of judicial
review.151 In theory, any form of judicial review may be compatible with
modem democratic government because there really is no such beast as true
democratic government. Some forms of judicial review may be better or worse,
but not because of their relative impacts on the character of democratic
government.
In terms of the developing nations of Central and Eastern Europe, this easy
answer to the counter-majoritarian difficulty may be unsatisfactory. To accept
the argument fully, it is necessary first to abandon the idea that democracy has
important normative force, at least as an ideal. In essence, the theory contends
that the only democratic justification for judicial review is that it is no less
democratic than ordinary bureaucracy. For new societies eager to embrace
democratic self-government, this form of legitimation may be sorely
insufficient.
B. Notions of Democratic Constitutionalism
For this reason, the growing interest in the democratic features of judicial
review may be particularly appealing to the new nations of Central and Eastern
Europe. Over the years, a number of scholars and judges have concluded that
judicial review is not only compatible with democratic self-government, but it
is, in fact, a necessary component of such government. According to this line
of thought, judicial review plays an important role in the creation and
perpetuation of constitutional democracies and, therefore, can be understood as
an essentially democratic practice.
Two distinct reasons for the necessity of judicial review in a democracy
have been posited. First, judicial review may be a form of democratic
enforcement that protects the "deeper" democratic judgments of the people
expressed in a constitution from the vicissitudes of temporary majorities (or the
more representative judgments of the legislature against the irresponsible
decisions of government bureaucrats). Second, judicial review may be
150 See WELLINGTON, supra note 148, at 30 ("The prevalence of nonmajoritarian
decisionmaking in America suggests that the anxiety some have about judicial review cannot
be fully explained by the fact that it is (as Bickel insisted) a deviant institution in American
democracy.").
151 This is not to suggest that adherents to this view do not themselves have their own
preferences regarding judicial review. Instead, it is only to indicate that the view itself does
not require any particular conclusion.
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necessary to protect the values that are "required" by democracy itself, even if
those values are not expressed within a constitution. These theories are unified
only in their belief that without judicial review, the practice of democracy may
be imperiled.
1. In Defense of the "Will of the People"
Some theorists argue that enforcement of a constitution against a present
legislative majority is actually prodemocratic because it "preserves" the validity
of democratically created values against less than perfectly representative
legislatures. 152 This argument has a distinguished lineage in the United States,
dating to the debates over ratification of the Constitution. In The Federalist
Papers, Alexander Hamilton based his rationale for judicial review on the
theory that in declaring a legislative act void, the judiciary was merely acting to
keep the legislature within the limits democratically established by the people of
the United States. 153
This argument has also been appealing to European constitutional scholars
in recent years. In defending the development of judicial review in France,
Professor Louis Favoreu has argued: "[If] the law does not conform to the
Constitution, it is not the expression of the general will. A majority of elected
deputies cannot defeat what has been established in favor of a much larger
consensus."
154
This defense of the institution of judicial review has interesting
implications for the scope of that power. First, under its theory, the appropriate
nature of judicial review in any country will be highly contingent upon the
actual content of the country's constitution. If the constitution is entirely
structural, then defending the will of the people can easily be performed by a
single constitutional court. If the constitution is generous in its protection of
individual rights, as are many of the new states of Central and Eastern Europe,
however, the project of constitutional enforcement may require a number of
courts with the authority to invalidate legislative and executive actions. Second,
standing rules would necessarily have to be fairly broad. Because the premise
of this defense of judicial review is that the representative branches of the
government are inadequately reflecting the more enduring wishes of the
populace, standing should not be limited to agents of those representative
152 For a recent exposition of such a view, see BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE:
FOUNDATIONS 6-16 (1992).
153 See THE FEDERALIST PAPERS, supra note 73, at 229, 231.
154 See Vroom, supra note 28, at 305-06 (quoting Favoreu, Le Droit Constitutionnel
jurisprudential en 1981-1982, 1982 R.D.P. 359, 435).
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branches. Instead, at some juncture, standing for ordinary citizens will be
required.
2. The Existence of "Fundamental" Democratic Values
In contrast, other theorists have taken the position that, in fact, democracy
itself requires the protection of certain critical fundamental values, irrespective
of whether those rights are contained in a written constitution. 155 In their view,
societies without these rights cannot properly be characterized as
democratic. 156 Judicial review is only the process by which the essential
democratic nature of a society is protected from the potential tyranny of
temporary legislative majorities. The institution is, therefore, not counter-
majoritarian because it is quintessentially prodemocratic.
Of course, the scope of the rights that are absolutely necessary to
democracy varies considerably. Some theorists assert that "equality" of the
citizenry is indispensable to the definition of democracy. 157 Perhaps most
visibly, John Hart Ely has taken the position that the democratic function of
judicial review is to protect those rights directly relating to the functioning of
the political process. 158 These rights must be guarded by judicial review in a
democratic society because, otherwise, the democracy could not function
properly. 159 Justice Thurgood Marshall has fused these two lines of thought. In
155 "The case is made that the liberal democratic society rests, at bottom, on certain
basic ideals-free speech and discussion, freedom of association, freedom of conscience-
and that when these are threatened by executive-legislative authority it is absurd to rest on
any abstract, academic conception of the Separation of Powers and say that the judges may
not properly intervene in protection of them." McWHINNEY, supra note 60, at 215.
156 See, e.g., MARK V. TUSHNET, RED, WHrrE, AND BLUE: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF
CoNsTrrUTIoNAL LAw 71 (1988) (citing John Rawls and Robert Nozick as examples);
AHARONBARAK, JuDIciAL DIsCRE&ioN 195 (1989) (Democracy "is not simply majority rule.
... It is the realization of certain fundamental values, such as basic human rights.").
This "rights" understanding of democracy has been vigorously attacked by
Schumpeter: "Democracy is a political method, that is to say, a certain type of institutional
arrangement for arriving at political-legislative and administrative-decisions and hence
incapable of being an end in itself, irrespective of what decisions it will produce under given
historical conditions." JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM, AND DEMOCRACY
242 (1950).
157 See, e.g., Robert Burt, Constitutional Law and the Teaching of the Parables, 93
YALE LJ. 455, 455 (1984) ("equality is a bedrock substantive principle of democratic
theory").
158 See generally JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST (1980).
159 Id. at 101-03.
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San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez160 he argued that relative
equality in education was a necessary prerequisite to democratic participation in
politics and was, therefore, constitutionally required.
The implications for judicial review of this sort of theorizing is contingent
upon the particular theory that is being considered. Political process-based
theories like Ely's are more compatible with single court, a priori review than
are "fundamental democratic values" theories of judicial review. Schemes
based on inherent fundamental rights like equality are likely to be difficult for
unitary constitutional courts. Abstract or a priori review will also likely be
ineffective in protecting fundamental individual rights. Abstract review will
have difficulty discerning the tremendous variety of ways in which various
fundamental individual rights may be threatened by any given measure.
C. The Dangers of Judicial Review to Democracy
No discussion of the relationship between judicial review and democracy
would be complete without a discussion of a school of thought that entirely
rejects judicial review on grounds of incompatibility with democracy. In a
sense, this view takes Bickel's counter-majoritarian difficulty so seriously that
it is willing to jettison the institution of judicial review entirely in favor of
majoritarian supremacy.
The core of this democratic objection to judicial review is the belief that
responsibility is the only means by which people can learn to govern
themselves. Through the process of self-government, and the occasional
failure, people learn moral responsibility and thereby attain the potential to
govern themselves effectively. "Participation in the process of government
uplifts the participants in their knowledge and sensitivity to the needs of others,
enhances their sense of mature responsibility, and fully integrates each
individual into the community." 161
The problem with judicial review, in this view, is that it partially relieves
the people of responsibility for their political choices. The classic statement of
this view was stated by James Bradley Thayer:
[The exercise [ofjudicial review], even when unavoidable, is always attended
with a serious evil, namely, that the correction of legislative mistakes comes
from the outside, and the people thus lose the political experience, and the
moral education and stimulus that comes from fighting the question out in the
ordinary way, and correcting their own errors. The tendency of a common and
easy resort to this great function, now lamentably too common, is to dwarf the
160 411 U.S. 1, 113-17 (1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
161 See Ides, supra note 148, at 4 (describing Rousseau's attitude toward democracy).
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political capacity of the people, and to deaden its sense of moral
responsibility. 162
The danger of this "deadening" of moral responsibility is its tendency,
paradoxically, to expose the populace to precisely the same sort of majoritarian
dictatorship that judicial review is supposed to prevent. By reducing the
political capacity of the people to govern themselves on day-to-day matters,
judicial review may inhibit the ability of the people to respond responsibly
when serious threats to their political liberty emerge. This is critical, because
judicial review is likely to be a thin line of defense against a truly significant
threat to liberty, such as the rise of fascist nationalism or the eruption of social
chaos. 163
Similar views have been expressed in support of the continuation of the
British system of parliamentary supremacy. In his essay The Political
Constitution, J.A.G. Griffith argues against instituting American-style judicial
review in Great Britain. He asserts that judicial review, whether based on a Bill
of Rights or upon some idealized "moral consensus," would not save the
people of Great Britain from legislative tyranny; instead, it would only mask
the existing real political disagreements. 164 According to Griffith, only the
robust exercise of political rights, unencumbered by a judicial prop, can
provide a permanent platform for the protection of liberty.165
These observations, while worthy of attention, are not usefully applicable
to the present situation in Central and Eastern Europe. An experiment with
parliamentary supremacy in the new nations of Central and Eastern Europe
would be highly inappropriate. It is certainly true that the institution of judicial
review cannot provide salvation for a nation bent on destroying the political
and civil liberties of a minority of its citizens. It also seems certain, however,
162 Id. at 24 (quoting JAMES BRADLEY THAYER, JOHN MARSHALL 106-07 (1901)).
163 As Justice Robert Jackson wrote,
I know of no modem instance in which any judiciary has saved a whole people from
the great currents of intolerance, passion, usurpation, and tyranny which have
threatened liberty and free institutions.... No court can support a reactionary regime
and no court can innovate or implement a new one. I doubt that any court, whatever its
powers, could have saved Louis XVI or Marie Antoinette. None could have avoided
the French Revolution, none could have stopped its excesses, and none could have
prevented its culmination in the dictatorship of Napoleon.
ROBERT H. JACKSON, THE SUPREME COURT IN THE AMERicAN SYSTEM OF GoVERNMENT 80
(1955).
164 J.A.G. Griffith, The Political Constitution, 42 MOD. L. REV. 1, 16, 19 (1979).
165 Id. at 16.
[Vol. 54:559
JUDICIAL REVIEW
that the success of nonjudicial review nations, like Great Britain, is largely due
to the existence of traditions of adherence to the "rule of law." In the new
states, there is no such tradition. Under such circumstances, judicial review
would seem to be an absolutely necessary safeguard of whatever form of
democratic self-government those nations choose to adopt. A doctrine of
legislative supremacy without a tradition of the rule of law could be extremely
dangerous. 166
This Article has only begun to sketch the implications of various theories
of judicial review within the framework of democracy as it exists in the West.
As the new nations of Central and Eastern Europe move forward in their
development, the details of the sketch will become clearer and some issues will
be resolved. Doubtless the new nations will generate their own understandings
of judicial review and democracy, and this will likely create new issues which
will need to be explored. The important observation of this discussion,
however, is that the theoretical underpinnings of judicial review can have a
critical impact on the appropriate structure of the institution. These theoretical
considerations should not be ignored in the illusory belief that they are
irrelevant to practical questions of institutional design.
V. CONCLUSION
The new nations of Central and Eastern Europe are now engaged in the
critical task of forming the institutions that will determine the shape of their
societies for years to come. In doing so, they look to the West for information
and precedents and are attempting to derive what they can from Western
experiences, both good and bad. The comparative analysis of institutions, like
the analysis of judicial review contained in this Article, is an important part of
this endeavor.
For the new nations, perhaps the most useful aspect of Western
government is its experience with the principles of separation of powers and the
protection of individual human rights. Not only have the democracies of the
West had several centuries of experience with these principles, but they
represent working models of how theory is to be translated into practice. The
Western systems have had centuries to develop a variety of reactions to the
problems of government. Reflection on the successes and failures of the West
can provide a significant resource for the new states in creating their own
indigenous institutions.
This Article has attempted to perform such a task with respect to the
institution of judicial review. As it has indicated, there are a number of critical
166 See supra notes 57-63 and accompanying text.
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choices facing new nations interested in establishing judicial review, many of
which are closely interrelated. The choices actually made by any individual
nation, of course, will necessarily be based upon local conditions and upon the
objectives that the people of that nation set for their new governments.
Among the most difficult choices in the new states of Central and Eastern
Europe will be the prospect of adequately protecting individual human rights.
Many of the new constitutions of these states are quite broad in their protection
of individual rights. While these states may have a deep commitment to the
protection of individual rights, there are significant problems with creating
mechanisms by which that commitment can be transformed into enforcement.
Those nations whose legal traditions are the product of the civil-law and
socialist legal systems may not be prepared for the adoption of judicial review
on the scale that may be necessary for the adequate protection of the rights
which the new states would like to guarantee. These nations may suffer from
the absence of a culture of the rule of law, from a lack of jurists with the
qualifications to exercise judicial review, and from political elements
unaccustomed to accepting judicial interference.
This problem, the protection of individual rights in societies ill-equipped to
adopt broad judicial review, is profoundly deserving of further study. The
various institutions that have emerged to protect individual rights in other
nations, including the ombudsperson, the procurator, and the independent bar,
need to be examined in greater detail to determine to what extent these
institutions can be employed in Central and Eastern Europe. Through the
process of comparative analysis, perhaps even new variants of these
organizations can be developed that are consistent with the traditions and needs
of the new countries and that offer full protection of individual human rights.
The process of change moves slowly. The influence of Communism and its
practices has been pervasive and has made it difficult to immediately create new
and innovative solutions to many of the problems of Central and Eastern
Europe. As a result, many of the organizations and institutions presently in
existence may find themselves transformed and may eventually disappear
entirely. This flux may be frustrating to those who hope to see the quick and
easy rise of solid and stable constitutional democracies in the wake of the
Soviet Empire. It should be remembered, however, that free nations are built
not only upon the demise of tyrannical ones, but also upon the persistent efforts
of those who believe in the value of liberty and are willing to labor in the
pursuit of the vindication of that belief.
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